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Abstract
It is known that the impact of transactions on stock price (market impact) is
a concave function of the size of the order, but there exists little quantitative
theory that suggests why this is so. I develop a quantitative theory for the
market impact of hidden orders (orders that reflect the true intention of buying
and selling) that matches the empirically measured result and that reproduces
some of the non-trivial and universal properties of stock returns (returns are
percent changes in stock price). The theory is based on a simple premise,
that the stock market can be modeled in a mechanical way - as a device that
translates order flow into an uncorrelated price stream. Given that order flow
is highly autocorrelated, this premise requires that market impact (1) depends
on past order flow and (2) is asymmetric for buying and selling. I derive the
specific form for the dependence in (1) by assuming that current liquidity re-
sponds to information about all currently active hidden orders (liquidity is a
measure of the price response to a transaction of a given size). This produces
an equation that suggests market impact should scale logarithmically with
total order size. Using data from the London Stock Exchange I empirically
measure market impact and show that the result matches the theory. Also
using empirical data, I qualitatively specify the asymmetry of (2). Putting all
results together, I form a model for market impact that reproduces three uni-
versal properties of stock returns - that returns are uncorrelated, that returns
are distributed with a power law tail, and that the magnitude of returns is
iii
highly autocorrelated (also known as clustered volatility).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Stock Price as a Stochastic Process
In his thesis, The Theory of Speculation, Louis Bachelier treated changes in
stock price as a random variable[2]. In so doing, he was the first person to
mathematically model a random walk and was the first to notice that for simple
random walks, the variance of fluctuations increases linearly with timescale.
His thesis was written in 1900 and predated Einstein’s work on Brownian
motion by several years[3]. Sixty years passed before the economics community
took note of Bachelier’s work and began in full earnest to treat stock prices
as a stochastic process. At this time, it was determined that prices move in
percentage increments (called returns) rather than absolute increments, and
these increments were assumed drawn independently and identically from a
Gaussian distribution so that prices follow geometric Brownian motion. Using
this model for stock prices, the two most important theories in modern finance
were developed, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)[4, 5] and the Black-
Scholes-Merton Model (BSM)[6, 7]. These theories explained, respectively, the
relative pricing of stocks and the absolute pricing of options on stocks.
Why is it that stock prices can be modeled as a stochastic process? Without
considering the fundamental cause, stock prices must approximate a martin-
gale for a very simple but powerful reason - if the next value in a price series
were predictable using historic values of the series, then this predictability
1
would be exploited until it disappears (the act of exploiting diminishes the
predictability and is called arbitrage in finance). This result is related to the
weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which I discuss in more
detail later and which I use extensively in this thesis.
As for the cause of the random fluctuations in price, this question is a mat-
ter of much debate. The standard answer given by economists is heavily influ-
enced by neoclassical economic thought - that prices are always in equilibrium
and are determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply and the aggre-
gate demand of fully rational agents. This forces a very specific interpretation
for the randomness of stock prices: because new and unexpected information
arrives randomly and in random increments and because the market immedi-
ately incorporates this information into the stock price (through the updating
of fully rational agents’ supply and demand functions) then the randomness
of stock prices is just a reflection of the randomness of new and unexpected
information[8, 9]. There are many problems with this interpretation. First, the
large size and large number of stock price movements seems unexplainable in
terms of new information arrival[10] Second, that agents are fully rational (even
if considered in aggregate rather than individually) is highly debated[11, 12].
Third, it is known that the act of trading causes price movements and there
are many circumstances where a market participant will trade, and therefore
influence the price, without introducing any new information about the value
of the company.
Towards the other extreme of agent rationality, there is another possible
reason why stock prices can be modeled as a stochastic process. If agents
are assumed to act randomly and unintelligently and if their actions lead to
price changes in a deterministic way, then random price changes result from
the random actions of agents. Models that simulate the exact structure of
2
modern electronic markets, but that incorporate the random actions of agents
with ‘zero intelligence’ have been shown to reproduce many of the properties of
stock prices[13, 14]. These models suggest that the market is not an aggregator
of information per se, but a mere translater that takes random order flow as
input and outputs a price series that reflects this randomness.
As stated in the paper by Bouchaud[15] when discussing these two ex-
tremes, “of course, reality should lie somewhere in the middle”. We shouldn’t
expect the stock price of a company to be entirely detached from the funda-
mental value of that company. Alternatively, because the fundamental value
of a company can be so difficult to quantify, it should be altogether irrelevant
on the order of days, even weeks.
In this thesis, I will take seriously the suggestion that stock markets do
not act as aggregators of information, but act to translate order flow into a
price stream.1 By doing so, the market can be viewed entirely as a mechanical
system and any structure in the price stream that it outputs is entirely due
to the mechanics of the market and the details of the order flow at the input.
We will see that the structure of the price series is not trivial - relative price
increments, or returns, are not Gaussian; and the absolute sizes of returns
are autocorrelated. We will also see that order flow is anything but random,
it is highly autocorrelated and therefore very predictable. The way in which
‘the market’ transforms this autocorrelated order flow into the observed price
sequence, although complex and involving the strategic interaction of agents,
can be formulated as a simple equation. The result is that the interesting
properties of the stock price series emerge when autocorrelated order flow is
translated by the market. To the extent that the properties of order flow
1This can be reconciled with the standard interpretation of economists by considering
order flow and information one and the same. Many physicists have problems with this
interpretation because they argue it is unfalsifiable.
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are universal and derivable from first principles, the properties of stock prices
are then also.2 This research is at the forefront of research in the field of
econophysics and can be considered part of complex systems research where
complex phenomena are explained with simple models. It is square in the realm
of physics, where the universal and fundamental principles of phenomena are
sought.
1.2 The Properties of Stock Returns
Because stock prices tend to move in percentage terms, and not absolute terms,
the relevant variable for the study of price movement is the return, or relative
price increment. If the ith return is labeled ri, then it is calculated:
ri = δpi/pi ≈ log(pi+1)− log(pi), (1.1)
where pi is the midpoint price - midway between the highest price bid (best bid)
and the lowest price offered (best ask) in the orderbook.3 The approximation in
Eq. 1.1 is 99.9% accurate at short timescales (and approximately 99% accurate
on timescales of a day) - I will implicitly use it throughout this thesis. I
will measure returns at the timescale of transactions, and therefore i will be
considered a measure of transaction time, updated by one increment whenever
a transaction occurs.
In Fig. 1.1 I plot the daily price of the FTSE 100 stock index (a weighted
aggregation of the price of 100 stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange)
2See the paper by Gabaix et al. for an example of such a theory[16]. This was the first
attempt by a group of physicists in collaboration with an economist to derive the universal
properties of the stock market from first principles. Their theory contradicts the theory I
develop here and is at odds with the empirical evidence I present.
3See the Appendix for an explanation of how modern stock markets operate and for an
overview of the terminology.
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Figure 1.1: Daily price of the FTSE 100 stock index from April, 1984 through
March, 2007. The log of the price appears to follow a random walk but with
a dominant upward trend at long timescales.
from April, 1984 through March, 2007 (this data was downloaded from from
the website http://finance.yahoo.com/). As seen in the figure, the log
price appears to follow a random walk but with a dominant upward trend at
long timescales (this is why prices are often considered to follow geometric
brownian motion with positive drift - below I show why this is incorrect).
The drift term is just the expected return of stocks - approximately 12% per
annum. Because I will focus on micro-returns, returns measured on the order
of minutes and seconds, I will not compensate for any long-term expected
return. Its contribution at such short timescales is negligible - on the order of
10−6 per minute.
With the advent of large financial datasets, physicists and economists
have been able to document the specific properties of stock returns. The
uncorrelated nature of returns has been verified, the assumption of Gaus-
sian distributed returns (and therefore brownian motion) has been shown
incorrect[17, 18, 19], and the magnitude of returns has been found to be highly
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autocorrelated[20, 21]. These properties are universal and hold across stocks
and across stock markets - this by itself suggests a universal origin. Below I
show these properties for one of the stocks I will be studying. In total, I will
study 6 stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange from the period May 2,
2000 to December 31, 2002. The dataset I use contains all on-book order flow
for these securities, which represents roughly 60% of all traded volume during
this period. For details about the data and for information about the 6 stocks
used in this thesis, see the Appendix.
1.2.1 Not Autocorrelated / Efficient
In Fig. 1.2 I plot the autocorrelation function of one-transaction returns, ri,
for the stock Astrazeneca (AZN). As seen in the plot, returns do not show
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Figure 1.2: The autocorrelation function of one-transaction returns for the
stock AZN. Returns do not show signs of autocorrelated structure, even at the
timescale of transactions.
signs of being autocorrelated, even at the timescale of a few transactions!
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1.2.2 Distributed with Power Law Tails
In Figs. 1.3 and 1.4 I plot the probability density function of one-transaction
returns for AZN on semilog scale and the cumulative distribution function on
log-log scale. For comparison I also plot a Gaussian distribution with the
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Figure 1.3: The probability density function of one-transaction returns for
the stock AZN. A Gaussian distribution with the same variance is plotted for
comparison. The assumption that stock returns follow geometric Brownian
motion is incorrect.
same variance in Fig. 1.3. As seen in the plots, returns are not distributed as
a Gaussian. Because the cumulative distribution is straight on log-log scale,
this suggests the distribution has a power law tail, i.e., that
lim
x→∞
f(x)g(x) = Kx−ξ, (1.2)
where g(x) is some slowly varying function, K is a positive constant, and ξ
is called the tail exponent. For AZN, the tail exponent is measured 2.94. To
4I use the Hill estimator[22] to determine tail exponents throughout this thesis. This
is formulated as ξˆ = 1 + n/
∑
n
i=1
log(xi/xmin), where n is the number of observations
xi ≥ xmin. I usually set n such that 0.5% to 1% of the data is included in the estimate.
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Figure 1.4: The cumulative distribution function of one-transaction returns
for the stock AZN. The tail of this distribution decays as a power law with
exponent −2.9.
show that this behavior is not limited to micro-returns, I plot in Fig. 1.5 the
cumulative distribution function of the daily returns for the FTSE 100 index.
The tail exponent is measured 4.0. That return distributions have power
law tails has severe consequences for market participants. The stock market
crash of 1987, which was a one-day return of −12% for the FTSE 100, was
a 12σ event under the assumption of Gaussian distributed daily returns - an
impossibility (probability 10−29). Given that returns are power law distributed
and using the observed exponent of 4.0, such an event occurs with probability
5× 10−5, or on average about once every 70 years. Looking at the cumulative
distribution, this event is the last point and does not appear to be an outlier
- it is expected given the distribution.
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Figure 1.5: The cumulative distribution function of daily returns for the FTSE
100 index. The tail of this distribution decays as a power law with exponent
−4.0. The stock market crash of 1987 is the last point on this plot and serves
as an example of the likelihood of large events for distributions with power
law tails.
1.2.3 Clustered Volatility
In Fig. 1.6, I plot the autocorrelation function of the magnitude of one-
transaction returns for the stock AZN. This is plotted both in regular scale and
in log-log scale. Notice that the autocorrelation function decays as a power
law, the exponent is measured as −0.34. Again, to show that this is not just a
property of micro-returns, I plot in Fig. 1.7 the autocorrelation function of the
magnitude of daily returns for the FTSE 100 index. The exponent is measured
−0.32.
This property of returns has been called ‘clustered volatility’, where volatil-
ity is defined as the standard deviation of returns, i.e, the expected value of the
magnitude of returns. It is ‘clustered’ because of the autocorrelation function
- small values of volatility tend to be followed by small values, and large values
of volatility tend to be followed by large values. This clustering can be seen in
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Figure 1.6: Autocorrelation function of the magnitude of one-transaction re-
turns for the stock AZN. The autocorrelation function decays as a power law
with exponent −0.34.
100 101 102
10−2
10−1
100
Lag (days)
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n
 
 
|rdaily| FTSE 100
Power Law (−0.32)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Figure 1.7: Autocorrelation function of the magnitude of daily returns for the
FTSE 100 index. The autocorrelation function decays as a power law with
exponent −0.32. This shows volatility clustering is not just a property of
micro-returns.
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Figure 1.8: One-transaction returns as a function of transaction time from 1 to
1000 for the stock AZN. The high degree of autocorrelation in the magnitude
of returns leads to the clustering of volatility in time.
Fig. 1.8, where I’ve plotted the returns of the first 1000 transactions for AZN
from my dataset.
1.3 A Simple Model for Stock Returns
This thesis has three goals. First, to determine how order flow is transformed
into a price series. Second, to develop a quantitative theory for the market
impact of individual participants’ order flow. Third, to show that the statisti-
cal properties of stock returns (shown in the previous section) result from the
market’s action on order flow. To begin this process, I present below a simple
model for stock returns,
ri = ǫif(vi) + ηi. (1.3)
This equation connects order flow information, specifically transaction infor-
mation, to the price return. Here, i indexes transactions and is updated by one
11
increment whenever a transaction occurs - as stated before, this is also known
as transaction time. A transaction occurs whenever two market participants
decide on an agreeable price to exchange shares of stock for cash. Every trans-
action that occurs on an electronic order book exchange (which describes the
data I am analyzing) is initiated by one of the parties. One party has placed
a limit order - an order that specifies the minimum/maximum agreeable price
for selling/buying a specified quantity of stock. Another party finds this price
agreeable and decides to initiate the transaction . . . this requires that there
are no other limit orders at a more agreeable price or that specify the same
price and were placed earlier; otherwise the initiator transacts with the other
limit order. In Eq. 1.3, ǫi is called the sign of the transaction and is +1 if
initiated by a buyer and is −1 if initiated by a seller. vi is the volume (or
quantity) transacted and is measured in GBP (£). The function f(·) is called
the price impact function - an empirically determined function that specifies
the expected price impact, or response, due to a transaction of size vi. ηi is
an uncorrelated noise term that models the specific details of the orderbook
at time i that are assumed unimportant for the modeling of returns.
The motivation for this model is the following. Given the structure and
rules of the orderbook, we expect that buy (sell) transactions will tend to
cause positive (negative) returns - this is represented by ǫi. We also expect
that transactions with larger size should have a larger impact on the price. In
the model this is represented by f(·), which is some monotonically increasing
function, empirically determined and as yet undefined. Unlike other ‘zero in-
telligence’ models, which include complete order flow information containing
limit order placements and cancellations as well as transactions[13, 23, 24], all
order flow is condensed into transaction information. We should not expect,
then, that this model will generate all of the interesting features of price for-
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mation. It will be surprising how well this model, slightly modified, reproduces
stock price dynamics.
That the model might reproduce the properties of the return series is sur-
prising for another reason. If price is determined in the minds of market
participants regardless of what transactions are occuring, then transactions
should have no long term impact on price. Under this scenario, participants
tend to cluster limit orders around a collectively agreed price - transactions
might impact this price, but as limit orders are placed around the original
reference point, the impact disappears. The model suggests the opposite,
that transactions impact the price permanently and that this impact can be
measured exactly as shown in Eq. 1.3. That market participants accept the
updated price due to a transaction as their new reference price (as suggested
by the model) is a strong hypothesis - this will be tested towards the end of
Chapter 2.
Eq. 1.3 is in the tradition of market impact models found in the market
microstructure5 literature[25, 26, 27]. These models, although phenomenolog-
ically identical to Eq. 1.3, are framed in such a way that permanent impact
results from the informational content of trades and not ipso facto. Many pa-
pers in this literature find empirically that f(·) is a concave and monotonically
increasing function with volume[26, 28, 29], but theoretically they suggest f(·)
should be a linear function with intercept zero[25, 30] - this results because
a linear function is the only function that does not allow arbitrage oppor-
tunities. The disconnect results from the malformed assumption that price
impact is independent of past order flow - I will show that it is dependent
on past order flow, this will show up immediately when testing Eq. 1.3 with
5Market microstructure is a field within finance that attempts to connect the mechanics
of trading to price formation.
13
real data and is the subject of the next chapter. That liquidity - the price
response to a transaction of a given size - is dependent on past order flow was
anticipated, although unformalized, by Hasbrouck when he suggested that it
is the unanticipated component of order flow that impacts the price[31, 26].
The modifications to Eq. 1.3 that will be presented in Chapter 2 can be in-
terpreted in this way. Finally, I should mention two confusing parts of this
literature. First, sometimes f(·) is measured for individual transactions, and
other times it is measured for a collection of transactions all part of the same
large order. These functions are not the same and I notate the latter as F (·)
when discussing it in this thesis. Second, throughout the market microstruc-
ture literature, it is assumed that order flow impact consists of a permanent
and transient component - the former is said to be the information content of
the trade and the latter is due to market ‘friction’ (the cost of transacting in
the market). It is ambiguous if these components should be measured from
the unconditional impact of a transaction, or if they should be measured when
impact is conditioned on the specific order flow of a market participant. As I
show later in this thesis, the unconditional expectation of an impact remains
permanent, and it is only when conditioned on very specific things that the
impact appears transient.6
1.3.1 Results of the Model
In Fig. 1.9, I plot the autocorrelation function for returns produced by the
model for the stock AZN. As seen in the figure, the model fails because it
6It turns out that the conditioning variable that makes impacts (partially) transient is
quite meaningful. The condition is that the market participant who initiated that trade is no
longer active in the market. This means that in the eyes of a market participant, her impact
decays when she stops trading - to everyone else this information is fuzzy and therefore all
impacts appear as permanent (in one state of the world the participant continues to trade
and the impact grows, in another state she stops and the impact decays . . . this averages to
an overall permanent impact).
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Figure 1.9: The autocorrelation function of one-transaction returns generated
by the simple model of Eq. 1.3. The result is compared to the autocorrelation
function of empirical returns. The model produces returns that are correlated,
whereas the empirical returns are not.
produces returns that are highly autocorrelated. In the next chapter, I show
that this results from the autocorrelation of transaction sign, ǫi. That ǫi is
autocorrelated has been mentioned in the finance literature for quite some
time[26, 32], but the extent of this autocorrelation was grossly underestimated
until discovered by two groups of physicists[33, 34]. I will discuss the results
of these papers in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Long Memory of Supply and
Demand
2.1 Introduction
The simple model for stock returns presented in Chapter 1 was,
ri = ǫif(vi) + ηi. (2.1)
When testing this model with empirical data, the return was found to be
autocorrelated. This results because the sign of transactions, ǫi, is highly
autocorrelated. In Fig. 2.1, I plot the autocorrelation function of ǫi for the
stock AZN.
The autocorrelation function decays as a power law with an exponent of
−.67, making the curve unintegrable. Series that exhibit this property are said
to have long memory - this is because values from the distant past can signifi-
cantly affect present values of the series. The long memory of ǫi appears to be
universal, it has been verified for stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange,
the Paris Bourse, and the New York Stock Exchange[33, 34]. It is called “The
Long Memory of Supply and Demand”[35, 36] because it implies that fluctu-
ations in individual supply functions (leading to seller initiated transactions)
and demand functions (leading to buyer initiated transactions) also exhibit
long memory. There is an interesting consequence of this . . . buying and sell-
ing can be highly predictable and remains so for long periods of time. Taking
16
100 101 102 103
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Lag (transactions)
A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n
 
 
εi AZN
Power Law (−0.67)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Figure 2.1: Autocorrelation function of the transaction sign series ǫi for the
stock AZN. The autocorrelation function decays as a power law with exponent
−0.67.
AZN as an example, using a simple autoregressive model for ǫi there are peri-
ods of time when ǫi can be determined with 80% accuracy. For some stocks,
predictability remains above 50% for several weeks!
The predictability of ǫi leads to a very intriguing puzzle. If buying tends
to push the price up and selling tends to push the price down, and we know
that buying and selling are highly autocorrelated (and therefore predictable) -
how is it that prices remain uncorrelated and unpredictable? There were two
papers published in 2004 that independently discovered the long memory of ǫi,
Lillo and Farmer [33] (hereafter known as LF) and Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters,
and Wyart [34] (hereafter known as BGPW). These two groups posit two
different answers to this puzzle. Because the uncorrelated and unpredictable
nature of asset prices is also called market efficiency, I will call this puzzle the
efficiency puzzle.
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2.2 Review
2.2.1 Lillo and Farmer (LF)
LF suggest that the efficiency puzzle is explained by permanent price impacts
that fluctuate in size. These size fluctuations depend on liquidity, where liq-
uidity is defined as the price response to a transaction of a given size. Their
model is presented as a modification of Eq. 2.1,
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi. (2.2)
where ǫif(vi) is divided by a liquidity parameter λi. LF state that λi is different
for buyer initiated vs. seller initiated transactions, i.e., is dependent on ǫi.
The idea is that when buying or selling is predictable, the λi term increases
or decreases the price response of buying and selling such that returns remain
zero on average. For example, if it is highly likely a buyer initiated transaction
will occur, i.e., ǫi = 1, then λi is increased for ǫi = 1 and decreased for ǫi = −1,
such that the expected return is zero.
The exact form of λi is not discussed in LF, but they show plots suggesting
the liquidity term is acting in the correct direction when conditioned on the
predictability of ǫi (damping buys when buys are predictable, etc.).
2.2.2 Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters, and Wyart (BGPW)
BGPW suggest that the efficiency puzzle is explained by decaying price im-
pacts with fixed size. They state that impacts are originally fixed in size at
ǫif(vi) (on average) but vary in time with the propagator G0(τ), also called
a bare impact function. Here, τ is the time since transaction i occurred and
is measured in transaction time (transaction time is updated by one when-
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ever a transaction occurs). The total price impact measured at the time of
transaction i is,
ri = ǫif(vi)−
∑
k>0
G0(k + 1)−G0(k)
G0(1)
ǫi−kf(vi−k) + ηi, (2.3)
with every transaction into the infinite past contributing (Note: I have slightly
modified their notation). They find that G0(τ) decays as a power law, and is
tuned just-so such that the autocorrelation of ǫi is completely canceled and
returns remain unpredictable. As stated in BGPW: “Therefore, the seemingly
trivial diffusive behavior of price changes in fact results from a fine-tuned
competition between opposite effects, one leading to super-diffusion (the auto-
correlation of trades) and the other leading to sub-diffusion (the decay of the
bare impact function).”
BGPW state that the decay of G0(τ) is caused by mean-reverting (in price)
orderflow of liquidity providers or market makers. These are market partic-
ipants who are almost always willing to buy or to sell but do not want to
take an overall position. They place limit orders and make money by the ten-
dency of limit orders to buy low and sell high. Although market makers can
influence the impact of a transaction both through liquidity and by changing
the prevailing quotes (best bid and best offer prices), BGPW emphasize the
second option and say it is the mean reversion of quotes that causes the decay
of G0(τ). In a later paper by Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, and Potters [37] this in-
terpretation is changed such that market makers use both liquidity and quote
revision to influence the price, and a combination of the two causes G0(τ) to
decay - the exact ratio of the two is unspecified.
19
We can represent the BGPW model in a more general form,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi, (2.4)
where BGPW posit that,
λ˜i =
∑
k>0
G0(k + 1)−G0(k)
G0(1)
ǫi−kf(vi−k). (2.5)
2.3 Equivalence of the Models
We have two competing models for returns,
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi, (2.6)
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (2.7)
The first was proposed by LF and the second by BGPW. These two models
are equivalent with a simple change of variable,
1
λi
≡ 1−
λ˜i
ǫif(vi)
, (2.8)
and any differences between BGPW and LF are entirely in the assumed struc-
ture of the λ˜i or λi term and in the physical interpretation of the model.
LF do not posit a form for λi but state it is a liquidity term (the price
response to a transaction of a given size). BGPW posit a specific form for λ˜i,
λ˜i =
∑
k>0
G0(k + 1)−G0(k)
G0(1)
ǫi−kf(vi−k). (2.9)
Because their interpretation is based on a propagator G0(τ), this result is
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quite natural. Given that the general form of the BGPW and LF models are
identical, however, this can also be interpreted as a model for the variable λi.
Specifically, this is,
1
λi
= 1−
∑
k>0
G0(k+1)−G0(k)
G0(1)
ǫi−kf(vi−k)
ǫif(vi)
. (2.10)
2.3.1 Deriving λ˜i
I would like to derive the form of λ˜i posited in BGPW, Eq. 2.9, starting with
the general form of the model shown in Eq. 2.7 (this is identical to Eq. 2.6 with
a change of variable). In so doing, we will understand the implicit assumptions
of BGPW.
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (2.11)
Suppose that Ω is a set of publicly available historical financial data - possibly
the entire past history of ǫi and vi. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in
its weak form can be interpreted as,
E[ri|Ω] = E[ri] ≈ 0. (2.12)
This hypothesis is somewhat intuitive - we should not expect historical finan-
cial data to influence current returns. If historical data was predictive for
returns, then we would expect arbitrageurs to exploit it away. I show evidence
further in this chapter that it does hold - at least when using historical ǫi data
that is several transactions old. LF and BGPW show similar evidence. For
the time being I will assume it is true, so that,
E[ri|Ω] = 0. (2.13)
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Applying this to Eq. 2.11 gives,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] = E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] . (2.14)
If we take that,
λ˜i (Ω) = E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] = E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] , (2.15)
this amounts to assuming that λ˜i is independent of ǫi and f(vi). This is not
trivial and is a main assumption of BGPW. Doing this gives,
ri = ǫif(vi)−E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] + ηi. (2.16)
We would like to specify an equation for E [ǫif(vi)|Ω], given some set of histor-
ical information Ω. That ǫi is highly autocorrelated suggests an autoregressive
model might determine E [ǫif(vi)|Ω]:
E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] =
∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (2.17)
ak are the coefficients of the autoregressive model. BGPW empirically fit the
coefficients ak. We will see this below, and compare their results to the results
that I derive next. But first I show the final result of the derivation,
λ˜i =
∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (2.18)
Because ǫi sets the sign and vi sets the scale of ǫif(vi), E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] is more
sensitive to changes in ǫi than changes in f(vi) ... that f(·) is a concave function
only reinforces this (BGPW postulates a log and LF postulates a power law
with exponent less than one). This means that ak can be determined using an
AR model for ǫi alone. Assuming that ǫi can be modeled as a FARIMA(0, H−
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1/2, 0) process with Hurst exponent H , then in the large k limit[38],
ak ∼ k
−H−1/2. (2.19)
If γ is the decay exponent for the autocorrelation of ǫi when fit by a power
law, then H = 1− γ/2[38]. Using this, we have,
ak ∼ k
(−3+γ)/2. (2.20)
Below, I compare this result with the result derived in BGPW, which was
verified empirically there and in the later paper by Bouchaud, Kockelkoren,
and Potters [37].
2.3.2 Comparing to BGPW
Comparing the hypothesis of BGPW, Eq. 2.9, to the result above, Eq. 2.18
gives,
∑
k>0
G0(k + 1)−G0(k)
G0(1)
ǫi−kf(vi−k) =
∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (2.21)
We can now interpret the main result of BGPW as an autoregressive model for
ǫif(vi) with coefficients (G0(k + 1)− G0(k))/G0(1). BGPW determine G0(τ)
by empirically estimating the entire function and then fitting this to obtain1,
G0(τ) =
Γ0
(τ 20 − τ
2)φ/2
, (2.22)
1The original BGPW paper fit a slightly different function that was updated to this by
Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, and Potters [37].
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where I have changed some of their notation to fit with the rest of this thesis.
They derive the following relation between γ and φ,
φ = (1− γ)/2, (2.23)
and verify that it holds empirically. I would like to compare this result with
the result of Eq. 2.20. If instead of deriving the coefficients, ak, we empirically
fit them in an identical way to BGPW, then we have
ak =
G0(k + 1)−G0(k)
G0(1)
. (2.24)
From Eq. 2.22, we know that in the large k limit,
G0(k) ∼ k
−φ (2.25)
∼ k(−1+γ)/2. (2.26)
Taking the derivative of this relationship gives,
(G0(k + 1)−G0(k)) ∼ k
(−3+γ)/2, (2.27)
which means that,
ak ∼ k
(−3+γ)/2. (2.28)
This is the same result derived above in Eq. 2.20.
2.3.3 Conclusion
The general form of the two models posited by LF and BGPW are equivalent.
LF leave the model in its most general form, whereas BGPW use empirical
24
data to fit a specific form of the model that is based on several assumptions.
The main results of BGPW can be derived using the general model of
Eq. 2.7 with the following assumptions:
(A1) The weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) holds. That is,
E[ri|Ω] = 0. (2.29)
(A2) λ˜i is independent of ǫi and f(vi).
(A3) E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] can be approximated by an infinite autoregressive model
for ǫi and f(vi) with coefficients determined by treating ǫi as a FARIMA
process.
Because I reference these extensively, I have also added them to the Appendix.
(A1) was empirically verified in LF and BGPW. I will study assumptions (A2)
and (A3) in more depth in the next chapter.
2.4 Interpretation of the Model
Although the models of LF and BGPW are identical, the interpretation of
these models is still in question. As stated earlier, LF suggest that impacts
are permanent but fluctuating and BGPW suggest that impacts are transient
but fixed. If we take the following form of the updated model for returns,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi, (2.30)
we can interpret this equation in two ways:
(I1) The impact of the transaction at time i is
(
ǫif(vi)− λ˜i
)
with noise and
is permanent.
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(I2) The impact of the transaction at time i is ǫif(vi) with noise and is
transient. λ˜i is the instantaneous decay at time i of past transactions.
Because I reference these extensively, I have also added them to the Appendix.
The first interpretation is that of LF, and the second is that of BGPW. Given
that the terms ǫif(vi) and λ˜i are applied contemporaneously, it is impossible
to determine which of these interpretations is formally correct.
These models, however, are not complete models of orderflow. We can
look inside the mechanics of a transaction, separating it into one component
including the initial transaction impact (determined by liquidity) and another
component including the limit order placements and cancellations that occur
before the next transaction (which determines quote revisions). LF suggest
that λi (and therefore also λ˜i) is a liquidity term rather than a quote revision
term. BGPW suggest that λ˜i (and therefore also λi) is a quote revision term -
although in a later paper they say it combines both liquidity and quote revision
effects[37]. By looking at entire orderflow, we can determine which of these
is correct - I will determine this in the next section. The answer will have
ramifications for determining which interpretation above, (I1) or (I2), is more
natural - this is discussed in Chapter 4.
2.5 Evidence for Asymmetric Liquidity and
Not Mean Reversion
Suppose a transaction with known sign, ǫi, occurs at time, i. The probability
that future transactions have this same sign is defined:
p+(k) ≡ P (ǫi+k = ǫi|ǫi) . (2.31)
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The probability that future transactions have the opposite sign is defined:
p−(k) ≡ P (ǫi+k 6= ǫi|ǫi) . (2.32)
The expected return of future transactions (measured in the direction of the
transaction) with the same and opposite sign are defined analogously:
r+(k) ≡ E [ǫi+kri+k|ǫi+k = ǫi] , (2.33)
r−(k) ≡ E [ǫi+kri+k|ǫi+k 6= ǫi] . (2.34)
The price response of the market at time (i+ k) to a transaction of sign ǫi at
time i is (ǫiE [ri+k|ǫi]). This measures the expected return in the direction of
the original transaction at time (i + k) and if nonzero, means the market is
still responding to the transaction (if positive the impact is still growing and
if negative the impact is decaying). This is measured:
E [ǫiri+k|ǫi] =
∑
ǫi
E [ǫiri+k|ǫi, ǫi+k]P (ǫi+k|ǫi) , (2.35)
= p+(k)r+(k)− p−(k)r−(k). (2.36)
For the EMH to hold, the response should be zero . . . otherwise returns would
be predictable,
ǫiE [ri+k|ǫi] = 0, (2.37)
and therefore,
p+(k)r+(k)− p−(k)r−(k) = 0. (2.38)
Rearranging this into ratios, the final result is,
r−(k)
r+(k)
=
p+(k)
p−(k)
. (2.39)
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I call the term on the left hand side of Eq. 2.39 the return imbalance, and the
term on the right hand side of Eq. 2.39 the transaction imbalance.
If we decompose a return into two components, one component including
the initial transaction impact li and another component including the limit
order placements and cancellations that occur before the next transaction qi,
we have,
ri+k = li+k + qi+k. (2.40)
If we hypothesis that qi+k can be treated as a noise term, such that the EMH
holds without its addition, then we can analogously follow the definitions and
calculations above and end with,
l−(k)
l+(k)
=
p+(k)
p−(k)
. (2.41)
I call the term on the left hand side of Eq. 2.41 the liquidity imbalance. To
the extent this equation holds, it is liquidity and not quote revisions that
keeps returns unpredictable. In Fig. 2.2, I plot all three of these imbalances
as a function of k for the stocks AZN and VOD. As seen in the figure, there
is a delay before the return imbalance matches the transaction imbalance.
This means the EMH does not hold until k ≈ 15 for AZN and VOD, but
thereafter holds indefinitely (at least as far as we can measure it). There is
a further delay before the liquidity imbalance reaches them both, but it is
not a bad approximation to consider the quote revision term, qi+k, as noise.
This is because the return imbalance is almost fully reproduced by the liquidity
imbalance, especially for k > 50 for AZN and k > 20 for VOD, the contribution
of quote revisions to the return imbalance is therefore almost negligible.
To see how this looks in terms of market impact, the average total price
response (or impact) at time (i + T ) due to the transaction placed at time i
28
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Figure 2.2: The transaction imbalance (p+/p−), return imbalance (r−/r+),
and liquidity imbalance (l−/l+) as a function of lag k for the stocks AZN and
VOD. The y-axis is measured in units of the average spread. The transaction
imbalance measures the predictability of transaction sign - to the extent that
the return imbalance matches the transaction imbalance, this cannot be used to
predict returns. To the extent the liquidity imbalance matches the transaction
imbalance, it is asymmetric liquidity and not quote revisions that explains why
returns remain unpredictable.
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with sign ǫi is defined:
I(T ) ≡
T∑
k=0
E [ǫiri+k|ǫi] , (2.42)
=
T∑
k=0
(p+(k)r+(k)− p−(k)r−(k)) . (2.43)
If we naively assume that the magnitude of returns does not respond to the
transaction imbalance, then we can determine the average impact under this
assumption, IN , as follows:
IN(T ) ≡
T∑
k=0
E [ǫiri+k|ǫi] , (2.44)
= Io
T∑
k=0
(p+(k)− p−(k)) , (2.45)
where Io is a constant, the unconditional absolute midprice impact measured
from immediately before to immediately after a transaction. If we assume
in the return decomposition of Eq. 2.40 that quote revisions can be approxi-
mated as a noise term and disregarded, then under this assumption the average
impact, IL, is,
IL(T ) ≡
T∑
k=0
E [ǫili+k|ǫi] , (2.46)
=
T∑
k=0
(p+(k)l+(k)− p−(k)l−(k)) . (2.47)
I plot in Fig. 2.3 the empirically measured values of I(T ), IN(T ), and IL(T )
for the stocks AZN and VOD as a function of time since the transaction. The
scale on the y-axis is set in units of the average spread, i.e., the average dis-
tance between the best bid price and best offer price in the order book. As seen
in the figure, the empirically measured impact increases until T ≈ 15 for both
30
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Figure 2.3: The total price impact caused by a transaction at time T = 0
measured as a function of time T for the stocks AZN and VOD. The y-axis
is measured in units of the average spread. I(T ) is the empirically measured
impact. IN (T ) is the impact that would occur if the predictability of sign is
not compensated for. IL(T ) is the impact that would occur if quote revisions
are ignored and only fluctuating liquidity is included. That IL(T ) remains
relatively flat suggests that quote revisions are unimportant for keeping returns
efficient.
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stocks and thereafter remains constant. IN(T ) increases throughout and nicely
exemplifies the efficiency puzzle - that returns would be predictable if not for
compensation due to liquidity fluctuations and/or mean reverting quote revi-
sions. Notice that IL(T ) closely matches I and that it also remains relatively
constant throughout - this again verifies that it is asymmetric liquidity alone
that solves most, if not all, of the efficiency puzzle.
Notice also in Fig. 2.3, that impacts do not have a transient component.
Even when decomposing the initial transaction return (i.e., ri at T = 0) into
the components li and qi, the initial impact li is not reverted at all by qi -
in fact the impact is enhanced such that ri is larger. This is quite different
than what is usually assumed in the microstructure literature. It shows that
on average, all transactions cause an initial price response li that is enhanced
by the future values, qi, qi+1, . . . , qi+k and li+1, li+2, . . . , li+k, until k ≈ 15. ‘The
market’ accepts this new price (which is actually slightly larger than the origi-
nal impact) as the reference price for at least the next 200 transactions (about
2 hours for AZN). It is possible that decay occurs at a much later time, but
errors grow quickly[36] and to discern this requires a much larger dataset.
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Chapter 3
Theory of Asymmetric Liquidity
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I introduced the simple model for returns,
ri = ǫif(vi) + ηi. (3.1)
In Chapter 2, we learned that this model is incorrect because of the strong
autocorrelation of ǫi, and I presented two modified versions of the model that
were suggested by the first two papers on this subject,
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi, (3.2)
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (3.3)
These models are equivalent with a simple change of variable. It was shown
that λi and λ˜i are more appropriately considered liquidity terms rather than
quote revision terms because their effects are felt at the instant of the trans-
action.
There are two unresolved issues:
(1) Why does ǫi exhibit long memory, and who enforces that ri is uncorre-
lated, i.e., who is influencing λi and λ˜i?
(2) What is the correct relation between λi, λ˜i and the set of variables
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{ǫi, f(vi),Ω}?
These questions are discussed in succession below.
3.2 Theory for Autocorrelated Orderflow and
Liquidity Response
This section will discuss the first question from the Introduction of this chapter
- Why does ǫi exhibit long memory, and who enforces that ri is uncorrelated?
Let us look at the influence of an individual transaction at time i− k of sign
ǫi−k. Given the model,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi, (3.4)
and using the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), E [ri|ǫi−k] =
0, we have that,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k] = E [ǫif(vi)|ǫi−k] . (3.5)
We know from empirical data that E [ǫif(vi)|ǫi−k] and therefore E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k]
are generally not equal to zero. In fact, because ǫi−k and ǫi are positively
correlated, we know that,
ǫi−kE [ǫif(vi)|ǫi−k] > 0, (3.6)
and therefore,
ǫi−kE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k] > 0. (3.7)
I have so far offered no physical explanation for why these inequalities hold. A
theory for Eq. 3.6 was developed by Lillo, Mike, and Farmer in 2005 (hereafter
known as LMF)[35]. It is still not understood how Eq. 3.7 holds.
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3.2.1 Theory for Autocorrelated Orderflow
LMF suggest that market participants have hidden orders that are a true re-
flection of their intention to buy or sell a security, and these orders are chopped
into equal sized pieces, called revealed orders, that are then transacted. LMF
show that if the size of hidden orders are distributed as a power law with
exponent −(1 + α), then this produces an autocorrelation function for ǫi that
decays as a power law with exponent −γ, where,
γ = α− 1. (3.8)
The autocorrelation of ǫi is then due to the splitting up of much larger orders,
and therefore we should expect Eq. 3.6 to hold because there is a certain
probability that ǫi and ǫi−k are parts of the same hidden order. I show evidence
for this interpretation in Fig. 3.1. This figure uses a unique feature of my
dataset - that the brokerage codes are attached to all orders. These codes
are numbers that uniquely identify the member firms of the London Stock
Exchange (in the dataset they are anonymous - so that I cannot identify the
firm by name). With these codes, I can discern if a group of transactions or
other order flow is originating from the same brokerage or a different brokerage.
If from the same brokerage, this might be the action of two separate market
participants trading through the same brokerage . . . or might be the action of
one participant trading an order she has split into pieces. I will talk more about
these codes and how I use them to determine larger hidden orders in Chapter 5.
Notice in Fig. 3.1, that the sign of transactions ǫi is most correlated within
the same brokerage (power law exponent −0.40), is still heavily correlated but
less so without considering the brokerage (power law exponent −0.67), and is
not correlated at all across brokerages. There are two critical results we can
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Figure 3.1: The autocorrelation function of transaction sign ǫi for the stock
AZN under various conditions. The blue circles are the autocorrelation func-
tion when using the entire series, the green upward triangles are the auto-
correlation function when using only transaction signs originating from the
same brokerage, and the red x’s are the autocorrelation function when using
only transaction signs originating from different brokerages. That order flow
within a brokerage is highly autocorrelated (and order flow across brokerages
is not) suggests that market participants produce autocorrelated order flow by
chopping large hidden orders into smaller pieces.
interpret from this, and these results will influence the rest of this thesis.
(R1) Market participants exhibit autocorrelated orderflow (most likely be-
cause they have split up into pieces a much larger order).
(R2) Market participants do not correlate with each others orderflow.
Because I reference these extensively, I have also added them to the Appendix.
The concept of hidden orders will be used throughout the rest of this
thesis, and I present here the notation I use for these orders. All hidden
orders are indexed by j. The activity parameter, Ai,j, determines if a hidden
order is currently active, i.e., if the hidden order has the potential to cause
a transaction. Ai,j is equal to 1 if hidden order j is active at time i, and is
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equal to 0 otherwise. Hidden order j has sign ǫj and size Vj and begins at time
i = tj . It is assumed this order is split into equal sized pieces of volume vj
for a total of Nj = Vj/vj pieces. These pieces, numbered as nj = 1, 2, . . . , Nj
are transacted with probability 1/θj at every timestep i > tj until the hidden
order is finished. This means that the order transacts on average every θj
transactions. The time at which piece nj transacts is t(nj).
3.2.2 Theory for Liquidity Response
We still have no physical explanation for why Eq. 3.7 should hold. There
are two possibilities that can serve as starting points to a theory. Suppose a
market participant, identified as participant p initiated the transaction at time
i− k.
(P1) There are a group of market participants that collectively con-
dition liquidity on past orderflow such that Eq. 3.7 holds. At
time i, these participants force transactions with the same sign as ǫi−k
to have lower impact and/or transactions with the opposite sign as ǫi−k
to have larger impact. They do so because there is a certain probability
that participant p will place another transaction at time i with known
sign ǫi−k. The participants are thought of as market makers who do not
want the price to become superdiffusive.1
(P2) Market participant p conditions her transactions on the liquid-
ity parameter such that Eq. 3.7 holds. If participant p notices
that her trades are causing large impacts, she may decide to postpone
the trade to some later time or reduce the size of her transactions vi -
in fact, she may not be willing to trade at all unless she does observe
1See BGPW and the later paper by Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, and Potters [37] for a more
detailed explanation.
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liquidity as dictated in Eq. 3.7. Instead of market makers who work
to keep the price diffusive, the participants that determine liquidity are
patient position takers that are willing to wait for participant p to cause
transactions.2
Because I reference these extensively, I have also added them to the Appendix.
3.3 Determining λi and λ˜i
This section will discuss the second question from the Introduction of this
chapter - What is the correct relation between λi, λ˜i and the set of variables
{ǫi, f(vi),Ω}?. This can be decomposed into two parts. First, what is the
dependence of λi and λ˜i on historical financial data and what historical infor-
mation is included in determining these variables. Second, how are λi and λ˜i
dependent on ǫi and f(vi)?
3.3.1 Dependence of Liquidity on Ω
Given that the weak form of the EMH holds (A1), we have that,
E [ri|Ω] = E [ǫif(vi)|Ω]− E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] , (3.9)
= 0, (3.10)
and therefore,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] = E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] . (3.11)
2If this description is true, it would be quite interesting to study the dynamics of this
order-matching . . . the long memory of ǫi would result from two players each showing and
then matching a small portion of their true intentions at a time (they collectively decide
which participant will be the initiator of the transactions). They show only small portions
at a time so not to scare the counterparty away if it happens that their supply/demand is
much larger than the other participant.
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Using (A3), an autoregressive model for ǫif(vi) determines E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] so
that,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] =∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (3.12)
There are two reasons why this equation, and therefore (A3), may be wrong.
First, taking results (R1) and (R2) and assuming that (P2) from above is cor-
rect, then λ˜i is not a response to historic values of ǫi and f(vi) as suggested
by Eq. 3.12 but, in fact, ǫif(vi) is a response to λ˜i. The current and future
values of λ˜i can therefore be completely decoupled from the history of ǫi and
f(vi). As a concrete example, suppose that participant p experiences a favor-
able state of liquidity, λ˜i - favorable in the sense that she can place a series
of transactions without causing a predictable return. We can assume she will
continue to place pieces of her larger hidden order until either her hidden order
is completed, or until she finds that λ˜i is no longer favorable. In either case, λ˜i
is free to change at will and is not dependent on historical values of ǫi and f(vi)
- it may correlate with these, but it is not dependent on them. In this case,
there is no enforcer of the EMH as is suggested by Eq. 3.12, but the EMH
holds as a consequence of participant p’s reluctance to produce predictable
returns.
There is a second reason why Eq. 3.12 may be wrong. Depending on
the particulars of the ǫi and f(vi) series, we might more accurately model
E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] with something other than an autoregressive model. Taking re-
sults (R1) and (R2) and assuming that (P1) from above is correct, market
makers might somehow predict E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] more efficiently than with an au-
toregressive model. They will then set liquidity accordingly. Either of these
reasons, or some combination of them both, mean that the validity of Eq. 3.12
is up for debate.
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Let me formalize two equations for E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] motivated by the discussion
so far. These equations are an attempt to bound the dependence of λ˜i on Ω
between two extremes.
(E1) Assume that (P1) is correct and that the best predictor of ǫif(vi) is an
autoregressive model.
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] =∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (3.13)
(E2) Take that (R1) and (R2) are correct. Assume one of the following: (P2)
is true, or alternatively, (P1) is true and market makers have information
about who is initiating transactions and when they have finished placing
a hidden order.
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] =∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
, (3.14)
where Ω′ is information about all of the active hidden orders (those with
Ai,j = 1) . . . this includes their sign ǫj , their typical size vj , the average
number of timesteps between transactions for the order θj , and how many
pieces of the order have already been transacted nj. I use Ω
′ instead of
Ω because it is not necessarily publicly discernable information.
Because I reference these extensively, I have also added them to the Appendix.
These equations bound λ˜i because they represent the extreme views of
publicly discernable information. On one extreme, assuming transaction order
flow is a pure FARIMA process without any other structure - then the right
hand side of the equation in (E1) is the best predictor of ǫif(vi) and liquidity
should be set according to this equation. On the other extreme, assuming
there is complete structure to order flow such that individual hidden orders
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are discernable, then the right hand side of the equation in (E2) is the best
predictor of ǫif(vi) and liquidity should be set according to this equation.
The equation in (E1) was derived in Chapter 2, so I will not rederive it
here. The equation in (E2) results because of the following. The expected
value of the liquidity parameter at time i is the sum of the liquidity required
by participants currently placing orders, assuming (P2); or alternatively is the
total liquidity necessary for market efficiency given information about who is
initiating orders and when they have finished placing a hidden order, assuming
(P1). These are equivalent for determining E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′]
I will derive (E2) assuming (P2). The main principle is that market par-
ticipants will initiate transactions such that their impacts cannot be exploited
by other participants. Assume we have a background of noisy returns - com-
pletely uncorrelated. The task for participant p is to scatter the impacts of
her hidden order amongst this series such that returns remain unpredictable.
Assume that participant p is currently executing the hidden order j with pieces
of size (vj = v) each of sign (ǫj = ǫ). She initiates a transaction with prob-
ability (1/θj = 1/θ) at every timestep i > tj until all (Nj = N) pieces have
executed. The impact of each piece (nj = n), measured from before the piece
was executed until directly before the next piece executes, is labeled rn and
its expected value is,
E [rn] = ǫf(v)− θE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t(n) ≤ i < t(n+ 1)] . (3.15)
Here, E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t(n) ≤ i < t(n+ 1)] is the expected liquidity during the period
t(n) ≤ i < t(n + 1). It is multiplied by θ, the expected number of timesteps
until the next piece is executed. If λ˜i = 0 throughout the hidden order, then
a sophisticated trader would notice an autocorrelated structure of returns at
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and around lag θ. He could calculate the probability that this pattern will
continue as follows:
P (N ≥ n+ 1|N ≥ n) =
∑
∞
x=n+1Ax
−(1+α)∑
∞
x=nAx
−(1+α)
, (3.16)
≈
(
n
n+ 1
)α
, (3.17)
where we are assuming as in LMF, that hidden orders are distributed as a
power law, f(x) = Ax−(1+α). Eq. 3.16 is motivated by the following: the
sophisticated trader does not know N and therefore must calculate the prob-
ability that it is at least n+ 1 given that he has observed it is at least n. We
can understand how participant p is conditioning her orders by noting that
the sophisticated trader would be unable to exploit her if his expected return
is zero.
E [rn+1] = P
(
ǫf(v)− θE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t(n) ≤ i < t(n+ 1)])−
(1− P ) θE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t(n) ≤ i < t(n + 1)] , (3.18)
= 0. (3.19)
where P is short for P (N ≥ n + 1|N ≥ n). Solving for the expected value of
λ˜i,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t(n) ≤ i < t(n + 1)] = ( n
n+ 1
)α
ǫf(v)
θ
, (3.20)
This is what is required for participant p to continue initiating transactions.3
Given that E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] is the sum of what is expected by the current active
3Of course she would continue to initiate transactions if she found liquidity even more
favorable than this - this equation represents the bound at which she changes her willingness
to transact.
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hidden orders, we have,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] =∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
, (3.21)
which is the result shown in (E2). To quickly see that this is the same for (P1)
under (E2), note that market makers are acting to ensure E [ri|Ω
′] = 0. This
gives,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] = E [ǫif(vi)|Ω′] . (3.22)
The right side of this equation can be calculated by summing the expected
impacts of each hidden order . . . the expected impact of a hidden order is
just the probability that a current hidden order continues multiplied times its
expected impact at time i, (ǫjf(vj)/θj). This reproduces Eq. 3.21.
As for the plausability of (E1) and (E2), there are reasons to believe (E1):
Market participants may not be able or willing to condition their orderflow on
λ˜i, so that (P1) is correct. Also, it seems unlikely that market makers have
full information about who is initiating transactions. There are also reasons
to believe (E2): Participants may not initially condition orders on λ˜i, but
might realize they are being exploited and therefore incrementally adjust their
trading algorithm so that it slowly converges to a full conditioning on λ˜i. Also,
although it is unlikely that market makers know the full set of information
about hidden orders, they can make educated guesses - especially if it turns
out that only one dominant market participant is initiating transactions at
any moment in time.
In the next chapter, I will derive the implications of (E1) and (E2) for
hidden order market impact and show that one implies permanent impact
and the other transient impact. In Chapter 5 I will present several plots that
suggest which is more accurate.
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3.3.2 Dependence of Liquidity on ǫi and f(vi)
In this section, we will see that the dependence of λi, λ˜i on ǫi and f(vi) is not
fully specified by the EMH (A1). The relationship will need to be determined
empirically.
Starting with Eq. 3.2
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi. (3.23)
Given that Ω is a set of historical financial information, the weak form of the
EMH states that E[ri|Ω] = 0. This gives,
E
[
ǫif(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣Ω
]
= 0. (3.24)
We can state,
E
[
ǫif(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣Ω
]
=
∑
ǫi
ǫiE
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣ǫi,Ω
]
P (ǫi|Ω), (3.25)
so that, ∑
ǫi
ǫiE
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣ǫi,Ω
]
P (ǫi|Ω) = 0. (3.26)
Because ǫi is either +1 or −1, this sum is easily computed. Using that,
P (ǫi|Ω) =
1 + ǫiǫˆi
2
, (3.27)
where ǫˆi ≡ E [ǫi|Ω], produces the following,
E
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣ǫi = +1,Ω]
E
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣ǫi = −1,Ω] =
1− ǫˆi
1 + ǫˆi
. (3.28)
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I define the following terms,
r+i ≡ E
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣ǫi = +1,Ω
]
, (3.29)
r−i ≡ E
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣ǫi = −1,Ω
]
, (3.30)
so that,
r+i
r−i
=
1− ǫˆi
1 + ǫˆi
. (3.31)
Therefore, the ratio of the expected return of buyer vs seller initiated trans-
actions must satisfy the specific ratio in Eq. 3.31 for the EMH to hold. There
are a multitude of ways this can happen, for example:
λi = 1 + ǫiǫˆi, (3.32)
or in terms of λ˜i,
λ˜i =
ǫˆif(vi)
1 + ǫiǫˆi
. (3.33)
This hypothesized form for λi (and therefore λ˜i) satisfies the ratio. We can
look back at the form postulated by BGPW and verify that this also satisfies
the ratio (this form results from (A2), i.e., that λ˜i is independent of ǫi and
f(vi)) Using Eq. 2.16,
ri = ǫif(vi)−E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] + ηi, (3.34)
which incorporates (A1) and (A2) together, we see that,
r+i = E [f(vi)|ǫi = +1,Ω]−E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] , (3.35)
r−i = E [f(vi)|ǫi = −1,Ω] + E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] , (3.36)
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Given that,
E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] =
∑
ǫi
ǫiE [f(vi)|ǫi,Ω]P (ǫi|Ω), (3.37)
and with a little bit of algebra, we have,
r+i =
1− ǫˆi
2
(E [f(vi)|ǫi = +1,Ω] + E [f(vi)|ǫi = −1,Ω]) , (3.38)
r−i =
1 + ǫˆi
2
(E [f(vi)|ǫi = +1,Ω] + E [f(vi)|ǫi = −1,Ω]) . (3.39)
Notice that Eq. 3.31 holds, as it should.
The point is that Eq. 3.31 underspecifies a relationship between λi, λ˜i and
{ǫi, f(vi)}. We must look to empirical data to tell us about this relationship
- this is done in Chapter 5. Whatever this relationship, it must satisfy (A1)
and therefore Eq. 3.31.
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Chapter 4
Theory of Market Impact
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 I presented the two modified return models suggested by LF and
BGPW,
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi, (4.1)
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (4.2)
These models are equivalent, with the liquidity parameters λi and λ˜i related
as follows,
1
λi
≡ 1−
λ˜i
ǫif(vi)
. (4.3)
In Section 3.3.1 I calculated the dependence of liquidity on Ω, assuming the
EMH holds, and found that under two competing sets of assumptions, (E1)
and (E2), the respective results were,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] = ∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k), (4.4)
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] = ∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
. (4.5)
The first equation suggests liquidity is set by market makers using an au-
toregressive model for ǫif(vi). The second equation suggests that liquidity
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depends on the current state of all active hidden orders - this is either set by
market makers that know this information or exists because it is required for
participants to trade the active hidden orders observed. Because the current
state of active hidden orders may or may not be discernable with public data,
the second equation uses Ω′ instead of Ω.
In this chapter, I develop a quantitative theory for the market impact of
individual participants’ order flow under the assumptions of (E1) and (E2).
This is formulated as a price impact function of hidden orders. (E1) produces
a power law price impact function that can be arbitrarily scaled to zero by
slowing the speed of trading. (E2) produces a logarithmic price impact func-
tion that is independent of the speed of trading. At the end of this chapter, I
determine that under (E1) market impact decays to zero and under (E2) it is
permanent.
4.2 Determination of Price Impact Function
The price impact function, f(·), is defined as the average price response due
to a transaction as a function of the transaction’s volume,
f(vi) ≡ E [ǫiri|vi] . (4.6)
We can also define a price impact function for hidden orders, F (·),
F (V ) ≡ E

ǫ t(N)∑
i=t
ri
∣∣∣∣∣∣V

 , (4.7)
where the index j has been removed. There have been many studies that
measure the revealed and hidden order price impact functions for stocks[39, 40,
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29, 41, 42, 43] and some papers that suggest price impact should theoretically
scale as a square root of the volume[44, 16]. The empirical papers are in
agreement that the price impact is a monotonically increasing and concave
function of volume, but they disagree on the functional form (some posit a
power law, others posit a logarithm).
4.2.1 Revealed Order Price Impact Function
In Fig. 4.1 I plot the empirical one transaction price impact function, f(vi), for
AZN. This is fit with a power law and the resulting exponent is .12, which is
103 104 105 106
10−4
10−3
vi
E[
ε i
 
r i
|v i]
 
 
AZN
f(vi) =9.4e−05 vi
0.12
Figure 4.1: One-transaction price impact function, f(·), for the stock AZN.
Empirical data is binned by volume and the expected return (measured in the
direction of the transaction) is plotted on the y-axis. The curve is fit by a
power law with the estimated parameters given in the legend.
typical for the stocks that I study. This suggests that larger sized transactions
have a larger absolute impact than smaller sized transactions but a much
smaller relative impact (the function is highly concave). In Fig. 4.2 I plot
the estimate of f(vi) using only transactions that cause nonzero impacts, i.e.,
li 6= 0. This curve is a constant. It suggests that the size of a transaction
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Figure 4.2: One-transaction price impact function for the stock AZN when
using only transactions that cause nonzero initial impact. This function is
completely flat, suggesting that the curvature of f(·) is entirely due to the
probability that a transaction of size vi causes an initial impact.
does not determine the magnitude of the impact per se, but only determines
whether an impact occurs at all. The curvature of f(vi) in Fig. 4.1 is then
entirely due to the probability that a transaction causes a nonzero impact -
the larger the size of the transaction, the larger this probability. This result
was anticipated in the paper by Farmer et al.[45] where it was shown that
participants condition the size of their transactions to the size that is currently
offered at the best price in the orderbook, and rarely (about 15% of the time)
submit transactions with a larger size.
4.2.2 Hidden Order Price Impact Function
So far, I have assumed that each active hidden order j is split into smaller
pieces of equal size, and that the size of the pieces, vj, is independent of the
size of the hidden order, Vj. This assumption is motivated by the results in the
previous section - that participants initiating transactions do not determine
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the size of their orders, but take what liquidity providers offer at the current
best price.1 I also have assumed that the pieces of each hidden order are
executed, on average, every θj transactions.
2
If we take the assumptions above as true, then we can calculate the ex-
pected price response due to a hidden order. Disregarding the index j, the
expected return of a hidden order with parameters Ψ = {ǫ, v, θ, N} is,
EΨ [R] = EΨ

t(N)∑
i=t
ri

 , (4.8)
= EΨ

t(N)∑
i=t
ǫif(vi)− λ˜i

 , (4.9)
= Nǫf(v)− EΨ

t(N)∑
i=t
λ˜i

 , (4.10)
Here, I’m using the shorthand, EΨ [R] ≡ E [R|Ψ]. The impact R is defined as
the full return caused by the hidden order measured from directly before it was
started to immediately after it finishes. Eq. 4.10 results from the following:
the expected sign, EΨ [ǫi], is zero for all transactions other than those that are
part of the larger hidden order - this assumes (R2). We can now use Eq. 4.10 to
derive the expected price response due to hidden orders under the assumptions
of (E1) and (E2).
1Sometimes they take less, as seen with the large proportion of non-penetrating orders.
I am mainly interested in hidden orders of more than one or two transactions, and there is
no incentive for the revealed parts of these orders to be less than what is currently offered
at the best price - so I assume their size should equal what is offered by liquidity providers
at the current best price.
2This is similar to a VWAP trade (Volume Weighted Average Price). This is a standard
execution strategy and requires participation in a percentage of all transactions.
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Impact Under (E1)
Recall the equation for EΨ
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] in (E1),
EΨ
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] =∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (4.11)
Because Eq. 4.10 calculates the unconditional expected return of a hidden
order, the full information set Ω is not included . . . only information about the
parts of that hidden order are included. The expected value of λ˜i during the
hidden order is then,
EΨ
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t ≤ i < t(N)] = EΨ
[∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k)
∣∣∣∣∣t ≤ i < t(N)
]
, (4.12)
= EΨ
[
i−t∑
k=1
ak
ǫf(v)
θ
∣∣∣∣∣t ≤ i < t(N)
]
. (4.13)
Eq. 4.13 results from the following: the expected sign, EΨ [ǫi−k], is zero for all
transactions other than those that are part of the larger hidden order - again,
this assumes (R2). (akǫf(v)/θ) is the expected contribution of the hidden
order to the autoregressive model at each lag, k, while the order is active.
Putting Eq. 4.13 into Eq. 4.10 gives,
EΨ [R] = Nǫf(v)−EΨ

t(N)∑
i=t
i−t∑
k=1
ak
ǫf(v)
θ

 , (4.14)
≈ Nǫf(v)−
ǫf(v)
θ
EΨ
[
(t(N)− t)−
(t(N)− t)1−φ
1− φ
]
, (4.15)
≈
ǫf(v)θ−φN1−φ
1− φ
. (4.16)
52
Eq. 4.15 is a result of approximating the sums with integrals and by approxi-
mating ak,
ak ≈ φk
−1−φ, (4.17)
which uses Eqs. 2.20 and 2.23 and that
∫
∞
1
ak = 1 for a FARIMA process.
Eq. 4.16 uses that θN = E[(t(N)− t)].
The final result is:
E [R|ǫ, v, θ, N ] =
ǫf(v)
1− φ
θ−φN1−φ, (4.18)
=
ǫf(v)
v1−φ(1− φ)
θ−φV 1−φ. (4.19)
We know from Chapter 2 that φ = H − 1/2, where H is the Hurst exponent
of the ǫi series. For stocks, 1/2 < H < 1, so that 0 < φ < 1/2. Eq. 4.19
then has very specific implications for trading. It suggests that the impact
of a hidden order is a concave function of its total volume (a power law with
exponent greater than 1/2 but less than 1) and that the expected total impact
can arbitrarily be scaled by changing the speed of trading (changing θ). In the
limit that θ is infinitely large, the expected total impact is zero.
We can now determine F (·) under (E1):
F (V ) = ǫE [R|V ] , (4.20)
=
E
[
f(v)vφ−1θ−φ
∣∣V ]
1− φ
V 1−φ. (4.21)
In general, v and θ may depend on V , so they stay within the expectation.
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Impact Under (E2)
Recall the equation for EΨ
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] in (E2),
EΨ
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] =∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
. (4.22)
Because Eq. 4.10 calculates the unconditional expected return of a hidden
order, the full information set Ω′ is not included . . . only information about
the parts of that hidden order are included. The expected value of λ˜i during
the hidden order is then,
EΨ
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣t ≤ i < t(N)] = EΨ
[∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
∣∣∣∣∣t ≤ i < t(N)
]
,(4.23)
= EΨ
[(
n
n+ 1
)α
ǫf(v)
θ
∣∣∣∣t ≤ i < t(N)
]
, (4.24)
=
(
(i− t)/θ
(i− t)/θ + 1
)α
ǫf(v)
θ
. (4.25)
Eq. 4.24 results from the following: the expected sign, EΨ [ǫj ], is zero for all
transactions other than those that are part of the larger hidden order - again,
this assumes (R2). Eq. 4.25 uses that EΨ [n|t ≤ i < t(N)] = (i− t)/θ. Putting
Eq. 4.25 into Eq. 4.10 gives,
EΨ [R] = Nǫf(v)− EΨ

t(N)∑
i=t
(
(i− t)/θ
(i− t)/θ + 1
)α
ǫf(v)
θ

 , (4.26)
= Nǫf(v)− ǫf(v)
N∑
x=0
(
x
x+ 1
)α
, (4.27)
= ǫf(v)
N∑
x=0
(
1 +
(
x
x+ 1
)α)
(4.28)
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Eq. 4.27 uses a change of variable x ≡ (i− t)/θ. In the limit N >> 1,
EΨ [R] ≈ ǫf(v)
N∑
x=0
α
1 + x
, (4.29)
≈ αǫf(v) log (1 +N). (4.30)
The final result is:
E [R|ǫ, v, θ, N ] = αǫf(v) log (1 +N), (4.31)
= αǫf(v) log
(
1 +
V
v
)
. (4.32)
Eq. 4.32 suggests that the impact of a hidden order is a concave function of its
total volume, specifically a logarithm. Notice that the impact function does
not depend on θ, so that the speed of trading does not influence the total
impact of the transaction.
We can now determine F (·) under (E2):
F (V ) = ǫE [R|V ] , (4.33)
= αE
[
f(v) log
(
1 +
V
v
)∣∣∣∣V
]
. (4.34)
Again, v may depend on V , so the expectation remains.
4.3 Decaying or Permanent Impact
In Chapter 2 we were left with two interpretations, (I1) and (I2), for the model,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (4.35)
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(I1) states that transaction impacts are
(
ǫif(vi)− λ˜i
)
and are permanent. (I2)
states that transaction impacts are ǫif(vi) and are transient. I argue that the
most natural interpretation should correspond with what market participants
observe for their own initiated transactions - others might disagree, but I
believe this is how most people use the terminology. As shown at the end of
Chapter 2, at the finest level of measurement, a transaction causes an impact
approximately equal to
(
ǫif(vi)− λ˜i
)
- thus a market participant observes
this impact and (I1) is correct for the form of the initial impact. In this
section, I will study the second part of these interpretations . . . whether a
market participant observes her impact as permanent or transient. We will
see that (I1) is correct if (E2) is correct and that (I2) is correct if (E1) is
correct.
I introduce here the term, Φk, an additional information term such that
Φk = 1 when the larger hidden order that was partially transacted at time
i− k has finished and Φk = 0 otherwise. Starting with Eq. 4.2,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi, (4.36)
we have,
E [ri|ǫi−k,Φk] = E [ǫif(vi)|ǫi−k,Φk]−E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k,Φk] , (4.37)
6= 0. (4.38)
Eq. 4.38 holds in general, such that E [ri|ǫi−k,Φk] may or may not be equal to
zero. We can argue that,
E [ǫif(vi)|ǫi−k,Φk = 1] = 0. (4.39)
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We have evidence that transactions are correlated only because of the splitting
of orders (R1,R2). Because the order that produced ǫi−k has ended, i.e. Φk =
1, then we expect it to have no predictive power for future order signs. This
gives,
E [ri|ǫi−k,Φk = 1] = −E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k,Φk = 1] . (4.40)
This is an important equation, because it measures the expected return given
that the larger order partially transacted at time i− k has ended . . . if,
ǫi−kE [ri|ǫi−k,Φk = 1] < 0, (4.41)
the impact of the transaction at time i− k decays, and if,
ǫi−kE [ri|ǫi−k,Φk = 1] = 0, (4.42)
the impact of the transaction at time i − k is permanent. This is entirely
determined by the term,
− ǫi−kE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k,Φk = 1] . (4.43)
4.3.1 Decay or Permanence under (E1)
Under the assumptions of (E1),
− ǫi−kE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k,Φk = 1] = −ǫi−kE [λ˜i∣∣∣ǫi−k] , (4.44)
< 0, (4.45)
and the impact of the transaction decays when the larger hidden order com-
pletes. The first equation holds because the autoregressive model does not
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distinguish between transactions that are part of orders that have completed
and transactions that are part of orders that have not completed. Eq. 4.45
comes from Eq. 3.7, and is justified because under (E1), Eq. 4.4, the order at
time i− k always contributes to liquidity in the ǫi−k direction.
Interpreting this as in BGPW (I2), the original impact of the transaction
is ǫi−kf(vi−k) and decays by a fraction, ak, at each timestep into the infinite
future (this is its contribution to the autoregressive model at each timestep).
In the infinite future, the impact approaches zero - this is because the sum of
the autoregressive coefficients ak is 1.
We now have an explanation for the qualitative results of Eq. 4.19. Hidden
order impact is a concave function of N and V because the impacts caused by
the first pieces of the order have partially decayed by the end of the hidden
order - keeping θ constant, the larger the N the more the decay. Also, hidden
order impacts can arbitrarily be scaled by changing the speed of trading θ
because the longer a hidden order takes to trade, the longer the first impacts
of the order have had to decay.
4.3.2 Decay or Permanence under (E2)
Under the assumptions of (E2),
− ǫi−kE
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣ǫi−k,Φk = 1] = 0, (4.46)
and the impact of the transaction is permanent when the larger hidden order
completes. Eq. 4.46 holds because under (E2), Eq. 4.5, an individual trans-
action no longer contributes to liquidity, λ˜i, when the larger hidden order has
completed.
Interpreting this as in LF (I1), the impact of the transaction at time i− k
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is
(
ǫi−kf(vi−k)− λ˜i−k
)
and is permanent. The transaction influences future
impacts by contributing to λ˜i until the larger hidden order it was part of has
completed. Once the hidden order completes, the revealed orders no longer
contribute to λ˜i and their impacts remain constant, i.e., are permanent.
There is a slight complication to this. It is possible that under (E2) a hidden
order continues to influence liquidity after it has completed, and therefore
causes some amount of impact decay. If market makers are determining hidden
orders, then it can be argued that the hidden order should continue to influence
liquidity, even after it completes, up until the market makers have reasonably
determined that the order is no longer transacting (the time this takes might be
some low multiple of θ). We will discuss this again when looking at empirical
data in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Results
5.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4 I assumed that the weak form of the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH) holds,
E [ri|Ω] = 0, (5.1)
where Ω is any set of publicly available historical financial data. From this
assumption, I derived several results for the following equivalent return models:
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi, (5.2)
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (5.3)
Specifically, I was interested in deriving the dependence of the liquidity pa-
rameters λi and λ˜i on the order flow variables Ω, ǫi, and vi. In this chapter I
use empirical data to qualitatively test the developed theory.
5.2 Hidden Order Determination
As mentioned earlier, the dataset I use has a unique feature - brokerage codes
are attached to all orders. These codes are numbers that uniquely identify
the member firms of the London Stock Exchange (in the dataset they are
anonymous - so that I cannot identify the firm by name). Although I cannot
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Figure 5.1: The cumulative distribution function of hidden order size N for the
stock AZN. The tail of this distribution decays as a power law with exponent
−1.6 (although it appears to decrease faster than a power law for N > 50).
The measured tail exponent of 1.6 is evidence the LMF theory of hidden orders
is correct.
determine if two orders originating from the same brokerage belong to the same
participant or belong to two different participants using the same brokerage,
it might still be possible to determine individual participant order flow. As a
crude and first attempt to determine the order flow of participants1, I do the
following: if two transactions are initiated by the same brokerage, are within
100 transactions of each other, and have the same sign ǫi . . . I consider these
two transactions to originate from the same participant (and to be part of
the same larger hidden order). Using this ruleset, I group all transactions
into hidden orders. Some hidden orders will be of size 1 because either there
were no transactions initiated by the brokerage for 100 transactions before
and after the original transaction, or the activity has the opposite sign (in
fact, most hidden orders are of size 1 - which is expected if hidden order size is
1I am currently participating in a study that uses more sophisticated methods to deter-
mine participant order flow for LSE stocks.
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Figure 5.2: Autocorrelation function of the signed hidden order size series
ǫN for the stock AZN. Signed hidden order size is not autocorrelated - this
suggests the algorithm I use to determine hidden orders is working.
distributed as a pure power law). In Fig. 5.1 I plot the cumulative distribution
of hidden order sizes for the stock AZN using the method just described. The
tail exponent is estimated as 1.6. Looking back at Section 3.2.1, LMF suggest
that,
γ = α− 1, (5.4)
where γ is the decay exponent of the autocorrelation function for ǫi and α
is the tail exponent of the hidden order size cumulative distribution. From
Fig. 5.1, α = 1.6 and from Fig. 2.1, γ = .67. This is an accord with the LMF
theory and suggests my algorithm for determining hidden orders is working.
For further evidence that the algorithm correctly determines hidden or-
ders, I plot the autocorrelation function of ǫN in Fig. 5.2. By aggregating
transactions of the same sign initiated under the same brokerage code, the
autocorrelated structure of transactions as seen in Fig. 2.1 is suppressed in
Fig. 5.2.
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5.3 Dependence of Liquidity on Ω or Ω′
When determining the dependence of liquidity on Ω, I stated two extreme sets
of assumptions about market participants that bound the solution between
two equations.
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] = ∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k), (5.5)
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] = ∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
. (5.6)
The first equation holds under the set of assumptions (E1): that market mak-
ers condition liquidity on the predictability of transaction order flow, and that
the best predictor they can use is an autoregressive model for ǫi and vi. The
second equation holds under the set of assumptions (E2): that either mar-
ket participants condition their order flow so as not to produce predictable
returns, or alternatively, that market makers can determine who is initiating
transactions and when they have finished placing a hidden order. In this sec-
tion, I will try to determine which of the two equations, Eq. 5.5 or Eq. 5.6,
is better supported by empirical data. I first look at the expected return of
a hidden order as a function of its size. (E1) and (E2) offer two competing
and testable equations for this relationship. We will see that (E2) fits the
data much better than (E1). I then look at the transaction imbalance and
return imbalance under (E1) and (E2), and show that after a certain delay the
return imbalance matches the transaction imbalance for both (E1) and (E2)
so that returns remain unpredictable with a certain lag. This means that the
market is approximately efficient under both (E1) and (E2) - because (E2) in-
cludes a much stronger information set, the market appears to be responding
as suggested by (E2) with efficiency under (E1) as only a consequence of this.
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5.3.1 Expected Return
In Chapter 4, I derived two competing equations for the expected return of a
hidden order. Under (E1), this was:
E [R|ǫ, v, θ, N ] =
ǫf(v)
1− φ
θ−φN1−φ, (5.7)
and under (E2), this was:
E [R|ǫ, v, θ, N ] = αǫf(v) log (1 +N). (5.8)
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Figure 5.3: Scaled hidden order return as a function of hidden order size N .
The empirical data includes all hidden orders for all 6 stocks. This data is
binned by N and the mean value of Rθφ(1−φ)/(ǫf(v)) is plotted for each bin
with the error bars showing the standard error of this average. The theory
curve is what is predicted under the assumptions of (E1), i.e., N1−φ. I use
φ = .2 to generate this curve, which is the typical value of φ for the 6 stocks
(see the table in the Appendix).
In Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4, I test the dependence on N by dividing the mea-
sured R by all other variables found on the right hand side of the above
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Figure 5.4: Scaled hidden order return as a function of hidden order size N .
The empirical data includes all hidden orders for all 6 stocks. This data is
binned by N and the mean value of R/(αǫf(v)) is plotted for each bin with
the error bars showing the standard error of this average. The theory curve is
what is predicted under the assumptions of (E2), i.e., log(1 +N).
equations (also empirically measured - see the Appendix for details). In the
case of (E1), this should scale with N1−φ, and in the case of (E2), this should
scale with log (1 +N). Both figures include data from all hidden orders for all
6 stocks. The data is binned by N and the average taken for each bin with the
error bars showing the standard error of this average. As seen in the figures,
(E2) fits the data much better than (E1). To show that this is not a problem
with the scale parameter for (E1), I allow the scale to be a free parameter and
I fit it using least squares in Fig. 5.5. Even with this free parameter, (E1) still
fails to produce a good fit to the data.
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Figure 5.5: Scaled hidden order return as a function of hidden order size N .
The empirical data includes all hidden orders for all 6 stocks. This data is
binned by N and the mean value of Rθφ(1 − φ)/(ǫf(v)) is plotted for each
bin with the error bars showing the standard error of this average. The scale
parameter for the theory curve is fit using least squares and the result is
0.39N1−φ, where φ = .2, the typical value for these stocks. Even with this free
parameter, the theoretic curve (derived under the assumptions of (E1)) poorly
fits the data.
5.3.2 Transaction and Return Imbalance
In Section 2.5 I looked at the transaction imbalance and the return imbalance
caused by the existence of a transaction at time i of known sign, ǫi. Analogous
to that section, I look here at the transaction and return imbalance caused by
a predicted sign at time i. The predicted sign under (E1) and (E2) is the
following,
ǫˆE1i =
∑
k>0
akǫi−k, (5.9)
ǫˆE2i =
∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫj
θj
. (5.10)
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The probability that future transactions have this same sign or have the op-
posite sign is defined:
pE1+ (k) = P
(
ǫi+k = ǫˆ
E1
i
∣∣ǫˆE1i ) , (5.11)
pE1
−
(k) = P
(
ǫi+k 6= ǫˆ
E1
i
∣∣ǫˆE1i ) , (5.12)
pE2+ (k) = P
(
ǫi+k = ǫˆ
E2
i
∣∣ǫˆE2i ) , (5.13)
pE2
−
(k) = P
(
ǫi+k 6= ǫˆ
E2
i
∣∣ǫˆE2i ) . (5.14)
The expected return of future transactions (measured in the direction of the
transaction) with the same and opposite sign are defined analogously:
rE1+ (k) = E
[
ǫi+kri+k
∣∣ǫi+k = ǫˆE1i ] , (5.15)
rE1
−
(k) = E
[
ǫi+kri+k
∣∣ǫi+k 6= ǫˆE1i ] , (5.16)
rE2+ (k) = E
[
ǫi+kri+k
∣∣ǫi+k = ǫˆE2i ] , (5.17)
rE2
−
(k) = E
[
ǫi+kri+k
∣∣ǫi+k 6= ǫˆE2i ] . (5.18)
Just as in Section 2.5, the following ratios determine if the market is efficient
under (E1) and (E2),
rE1
−
(k)
rE1+ (k)
=
pE1+ (k)
pE1
−
(k)
, (5.19)
rE2
−
(k)
rE2+ (k)
=
pE2+ (k)
pE2
−
(k)
. (5.20)
As a reminder, the term on the left hand side is called the return imbalance and
the term on the right hand side is called the transaction imbalance. In Fig. 5.6,
I plot all these imbalances for AZN and VOD. Notice that the transaction
imbalance is much stronger under (E2) than under (E1) (and both are stronger
than the simple use of ǫi in Fig. 2.2 from Section 2.5). This confirms that
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Figure 5.6: The transaction imbalance (pE1+ /p
E1
−
and pE1+ /p
E1
−
) and return im-
balance (rE1
−
/rE1+ and r
E2
−
/rE2+ ) under the assumptions of (E1) and (E2) re-
spectively, as a function of lag k for the stocks AZN and VOD. The y-axis is
measured in units of the average spread. The transaction imbalance measures
the predictability of transaction sign - to the extent that the return imbalance
matches the transaction imbalance, this cannot be used to predict returns. In
both cases, the return imbalance matches the transaction imbalance with a
lag, although the lag is larger for (E2) than for (E1).
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information about who is initiating transactions and when they have finished
increases the predictability of order flow - a nontrivial result, but expected
under (R1) and (R2). Much more surprising is that the liquidity response
(return imbalance) is much higher under (E2) than (E1). This confirms that
the information available in (E2) is a better predictor of liquidity, and that
the market is responding to this information.
As before, there is a delay before the return imbalance meets the transac-
tion imbalance. The delay is longer for (E2) than (E1), suggesting the market
does not respond as quickly to the information assumed available in (E2).
The market does, however, eventually respond to this information (typically
at k ≈ 100) - a quite amazing result given how much detailed information is
used in (E2). This result offers more support that liquidity responds to hidden
order information (E2), and not just an autoregressive model for order flow
(E1).
5.3.3 Conclusion
Given the results of this section, (E2) gives a more accurate description of the
market than (E1). This means that either market makers can discern hidden
order flow, or that market participants condition their orders on available
liquidity. I will leave the determination of this to future work. In the next
section, I will assume that (E2) is valid when determining the dependence of
liquidity on ǫi and vi - this means that all predictors will be based on the
assumptions of (E2).
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5.4 Dependence of Liquidity on ǫi and vi
When determining the dependence of liquidity on ǫi and f(vi), I found that
the relationship is underspecified but the following ratio must be satisfied,
r+i
r−i
=
1− ǫˆi
1 + ǫˆi
, (5.21)
where,
r+i ≡ E
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣ǫi = +1,Ω
]
, (5.22)
r−i ≡ E
[
f(vi)
λi
∣∣∣∣ǫi = −1,Ω
]
, (5.23)
ǫˆi ≡ E [ǫi|Ω] . (5.24)
Given that empirical data suggests the validity of (E2), I will assume that the
ratio in Eq. 5.21 holds when Ω = Ω′. Rewriting the equations above with
this assumption and explicitly adding dependence on the lag k, produces the
following,
r+i (k) = E
[
f(vi+k)
λi+k
∣∣∣∣ǫi = +1,Ω′
]
, (5.25)
= E [ri+k|ǫi = +1,Ω
′] , (5.26)
r−i (k) = E
[
f(vi+k)
λi+k
∣∣∣∣ǫi = −1,Ω′
]
, (5.27)
= E [ri+k|ǫi = −1,Ω
′] , (5.28)
ǫˆi(k) = E [ǫi+k|Ω
′] . (5.29)
Eq. 5.21 is then,
r+i (k)
r−i (k)
=
1− ǫˆi(k)
1 + ǫˆi(k)
, (5.30)
To show how well Eq. 5.30 holds for empirical data, I plot in Fig. 5.7 the
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Figure 5.7: The ratio
(
r+i (k)/r
−
i (k)
)
as a function of the sign predictor ǫˆi(k)
for k = 0 and k = 100 for the stocks AZN and VOD. The data is binned
by ǫˆi(k) such that each point contains an equal number of observations, and
the mean value of
(
r+i (k)/r
−
i (k)
)
is plotted for each bin. For returns to be
unpredictable, these points must lie along the curve (1− ǫˆi(k)) / (1 + ǫˆi(k))
(shown in black).
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left hand side of the equation as a function of ǫˆi(k) for AZN and VOD. I
show two values of k, k = 0 and k = 100, and all of the data is included for
both. ǫi can be predicted much better for k = 0 than for k = 100, this is
why there is more spread on the x-axis for the data when k = 0 than when
k = 100. As seen in the figure, the theoretic result does not hold for k = 0,
but holds (at least approximately) for k = 100. This is the same result shown
in the previous section, that under (E2) the return imbalance approaches the
transaction imbalance with a lag of k ≈ 100.
Fig. 5.7 shows that it will be quite difficult to measure the exact dependence
of liquidity on ǫi. Most of the data is centered on the x-axis around 0 where
it is difficult to distinguish linear from nonlinear behavior. This means that
when looking at the separate dependence of r+i (k) and r
−
i (k) on ǫˆi(k), it will
be difficult to distinguish between the following possibilities:
r+i (k) = 1− ǫˆi(k), (5.31)
r−i (k) = 1 + ǫˆi(k). (5.32)
or,
r+i (k) =
1
1 + ǫˆi(k)
, (5.33)
r−i (k) =
1
1− ǫˆi(k)
. (5.34)
This difficulty is compounded by several other issues. First, r+i (k) and r
−
i (k)
depend on k and therefore must be specified for all k. Second, for large values
of k, where (E2) is most valid, the results are noisier and even more clustered
around 0. Third, this relationship is stock dependent. Fourth and finally,
the relationship is not always symmetric for r+i (k) and r
−
i (k) (in the above
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equations, the relationships are symmetric). Because of these problems, I will
be satisfied here with a qualitative understanding of the dependence and will
leave as future work the exact specification. In Fig. 5.8, I plot r+i (0) and r
−
i (0)
vs. ǫˆi(0) for the stocks AZN and VOD. The dependence is relatively linear for
both r+i (0) and r
−
i (0) and appears symmetric for r
+
i (0) and r
−
i (0) (although
for VOD, buyer initiated transactions tend to respond to predictability more
than seller initiated transactions). This suggests that the dependence is close
to,
r+i (0) ∼ 1− ǫˆi(0), (5.35)
r−i (0) ∼ 1 + ǫˆi(0). (5.36)
As shown in Section 3.3.2, these equations result from one of the assumptions
made by BGPW, specifically (A2) - that λ˜i is independent of ǫi and f(vi).
This suggests the following,
λ˜i(Ω
′) = E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] . (5.37)
Another possibility that also reproduces Eqs. 5.35 and 5.36 is that,
1
λi
= 1− ǫiǫˆi(0), (5.38)
which means,
λ˜i = ǫˆi(0)f(vi). (5.39)
Although I do not show it here, the results of the model are nearly identical
when using Eq. 5.37 or Eq. 5.39.
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Figure 5.8: The expected return of buyer
(
r+i (0)
)
and seller
(
r−i (0)
)
initiated
transactions as a function of the sign predictor ǫˆi(0). k = 0 in these plots.
The data is binned by ǫˆi(0) such that each point contains an equal number of
observations, and the mean values of r+i (0) and r
−
i (0) are plotted for each bin
with the error bars showing the standard error of this average.
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5.4.1 Conclusion
Qualitatively, λ˜i seems independent of ǫi and vi. This suggests that the final
form of the model is just,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i(Ω
′) + ηi, (5.40)
where λ˜i is determined by the set of information Ω
′ as follows,
λ˜i =
∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
. (5.41)
I will look at the results of this model in the next section.
5.5 Replicating the Properties of Returns
In this section, I encorporate the results above into the BGPW form of the
modified return model,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (5.42)
The results of Section 5.3 suggest that (E2) is a more accurate description of
the stock market than (E1). The expected value of liquidity, therefore, can be
approximated by the following,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] =∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
. (5.43)
The results of Section 5.4, although qualititative and not decisive, suggest that
the liquidity term λi is independent of ǫi and f(vi),
λ˜i(Ω
′) = E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] . (5.44)
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The final result for the model is then,
ri = ǫif(vi)−
∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
+ ηi. (5.45)
Below, I use the right hand side of Eq. 5.45 to generate a return series for
the stocks AZN and VOD. All hidden order information is determined using
the algorithm discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The noise term ηi
is modeled as Gaussian noise with the variance scaled such that the autocor-
relation of absolute returns is of the same magnitude in the model as in the
empirical data. For information about fitting the other parameters, see the
Appendix.
5.5.1 Not Autocorrelated / Efficient
In Section 1.2.1 I showed that returns are uncorrelated for the stock AZN.
In Fig. 5.9, I compare the autocorrelation function of one-transaction returns
generated by the model of Eq. 5.45 to the autocorrelation function of empirical
returns. The figure contains results for the stocks AZN and VOD. Returns
generated by the model are autocorrelated at low lags - this is a discrepancy
with the empirical returns. However, this quickly dies away so that after a
lag of ≈ 20 transactions, the autocorrelation function of the generated returns
matches the empirical result.
5.5.2 Distributed with Power Law Tails
In Section 1.2.2 I showed that the cumulative distribution of one-transaction
returns exhibits a power law tail. Without showing the results, the model fails
to reproduce this property of one-transaction returns. This is not altogether
surprising. It is known that liquidity fluctuations dominate over volume fluc-
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Figure 5.9: The autocorrelation function of one-transaction returns generated
by the model of Eq. 5.45 for the stocks AZN and VOD. The result is compared
to the autocorrelation function of empirical returns. The model produces
returns that are correlated at low lags, but this quickly dies away so that the
result matches the empirical result after lag ≈ 20 for both stocks.
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Figure 5.10: The cumulative distribution function of hidden order returns
produced by the model of Eq. 5.45 for the stocks AZN and VOD. The result
is compared to the empirically determined CDF of hidden order returns. The
tail exponents of the compared distributions match well (3.6 vs. 3.5 for AZN,
and 3.8 vs. 3.6 for VOD).
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tuations at short timescales and that these fluctuations are distributed with a
power law tail[45, 46] The model in Eq. 5.45 does not allow large fluctuations
in liquidity at timescales of one-transaction because the liquidity term is a sum
over active hidden orders. This sum slowly varies through time. To correctly
model one-transaction liquidity fluctuations, it is necessary to use a noise term
distributed with a power law tail.
To show that the model does reproduce the distribution of returns when
aggregated, I plot the cumulative probability distribution of R (hidden order
returns) determined empirically and generated by the model for AZN and
VOD. These plots are shown in Fig. 5.10. The tail exponent of all distributions
are determined and printed in the figure legend.
5.5.3 Clustered Volatility
In Section 1.2.3 I showed that the absolute value of one-transaction returns
is highly autocorrelated. This property has been called clustered volatility,
because volatility, or the magnitude of returns, tends to cluster in time. In
Fig. 5.11, I compare the autocorrelation function of absolute returns deter-
mined using the empirical return series to that generated by the model for the
stocks AZN and VOD. The model produces returns with autocorrelated mag-
nitude and the autocorrelation function scales similarly for generated returns
and empirical returns, although in both cases the slope for generated returns
is smaller in magnitude than for empirical returns. It will take more exten-
sive study to fully determine if return magnitudes (and their autocorrelated
structure) are correctly generated by the model.
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Figure 5.11: Autocorrelation function of the magnitude of one-transaction
returns produced by the model of Eq. 5.45 for the stocks AZN and VOD. The
result is compared to the autocorrelation function using empirical returns.
The plots show that the model is producing autocorrelated return magnitudes
and that the autocorrelation function scales similarly to the empirical result -
however, the match is not exact.
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5.6 Decay or Permanence of Hidden Order
Impact
At the end of Chapter 4, I showed that transaction impacts should be com-
pletely transient under the assumptions of (E1) and they should be completely
permanent under the assumptions of (E2). In this section, I test this result.
In Fig. 5.12, I plot the average cumulative impact of a hidden order with size
N ≥ 20 as a function of lag k from its completion time. To make these plots,
I treated k > 0 differently than k ≤ 0. For k > 0, I plotted on the y-axis the
average of the price response at the specific lag k. For k ≤ 0, I rescaled the
total execution time for each hidden order such that all hidden orders began at
the same lag (the start lag corresponds to the average total time that hidden
orders of size N ≥ 20 take to complete). I then sampled the impact at 20
equidistant intervals for each hidden order and averaged this impact over all
hidden orders. The result is an increasing impact until k = 0 that rapidly
decays until k = 100 and thereafter remains relatively constant. This suggests
that (E1) and (E2) are both partially correct. As suggested at the end of
Chapter 4, it is possible that under (E2) a hidden order continues to influence
liquidity after it has completed, and therefore causes some amount of impact
decay. This might explain both the abrupt decay seen in the figures and also
the permanency afterwards.
We can now look back at the two interpretations (I1) and (I2) of the mod-
ified return model,
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (5.46)
(I1) states that transaction impacts are
(
ǫif(vi)− λ˜i
)
and are permanent.
(I2) states that transaction impacts are ǫif(vi) and are transient. Because I
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have argued that the most natural interpretation should correspond with what
market participants observe for their own initiated transactions, it appears nei-
ther interpretation is fully correct. Fig. 5.12 suggests that market participants
observe both a transient and permanent component to their impact - about
2/3 is permanent and 1/3 is transient. A complete study of this phenomenon
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Figure 5.12: The average cumulative impact of a hidden order with size N ≥ 20
as a function of lag k for the stocks AZN and VOD. k = 0 corresponds to the
completion time of the hidden order and k ≈ −875 corresponds to the start
time of the hidden order. To make the plot, the execution time for all hidden
orders are rescaled such that they start and stop at the times just specified.
For lags k ≤ 0, the average impact along this rescaled time is computed. For
lags k > 0, the the average impact is computed in normal transaction time
such that k is the number of transactions since the hidden order has completed.
Notice that for both AZN and VOD, there exists a permanent and transient
component to impact, and the permanent component is approximately 2/3 of
the total.
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Chapter 6
Summary
In Chapter 1, I looked at a very simple model for stock returns,
ri = ǫif(vi) + ηi, (6.1)
where ri is the one-transaction return, ǫi is the sign of the transaction at time
i (whether it is buyer or seller initiated), vi is the volume of the transaction,
f(·) is the price impact function - an empirically measured function, and ηi is
a noise term. This equation was motivated by a simple premise: that the stock
market can be modeled in a mechanical way - as a deterministic translating
device that transforms order flow into a price stream. Eq. 6.1 fails because the
transaction sign series, ǫi, is highly autocorrelated and exhibits long memory.
In Chapter 2, I studied two modified versions of the simple model in Eq. 6.1,
ri =
ǫif(vi)
λi
+ ηi, (6.2)
ri = ǫif(vi)− λ˜i + ηi. (6.3)
These models were suggested by Lillo and Farmer[33] (LF) and Bouchaud,
Gefen, Potters, and Wyart[34] (BGPW). The λi and λ˜i terms exist in the
models to compensate for the autocorrelated structure of ǫi. In this general
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form, the two models are equivalent with a simple change of variable,
1
λi
≡ 1−
λ˜i
ǫif(vi)
. (6.4)
This means that all differences between the papers by LF and BGPW are due
to the assumed structure of λi and λ˜i. LF posit that these terms model asym-
metric fluctuating liquidity, and BGPW posit that these terms model mean
reverting quote revisions. By decomposing returns into two components, one
component including only liquidity effects and another component including
only quote revision effects, I used empirical data to show that returns are ef-
ficient when disregarding quote revisions. This suggests that λi and λ˜i model
asymmetric liquidity rather than mean reverting quote revisions.
In Chapter 3, I assumed that the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is
valid,
E[ri|Ω] = E[ri] ≈ 0, (6.5)
where Ω is any set of publicly available historical financial data. From this,
I derived the dependence of the liquidity parameters λi and λ˜i on the order
flow variables Ω, ǫi, and vi. Under two extreme views of publicly discernable
information ((E1) and (E2)), I bound the dependence of λi and λ˜i on Ω between
two equations,
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] = ∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k), (6.6)
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] = ∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
. (6.7)
Eq. 6.6 is an autoregressive model for ǫif(vi) and Eq. 6.7 uses hidden order
information to predict ǫi and f(vi) (hidden orders are large orders that have
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been split into pieces and then transacted on the market). Eq. 6.6 holds under
the set of assumptions (E1): that market makers condition liquidity on the
predictability of transaction order flow, and that the best predictor they can
use is an autoregressive model for ǫi and vi. Eq. 6.7 holds under the set of
assumptions (E2): that either market participants condition their order flow so
as not to produce predictable returns, or alternatively, that market makers can
determine who is initiating transactions and when they have finished placing
a hidden order.
When determining the dependence of liquidity on ǫi and f(vi), I found that
the relationship is underspecified but the following ratio must be satisfied,
r+i
r−i
=
1− ǫˆi
1 + ǫˆi
, (6.8)
where the left hand side is the ratio of expected returns for buyer r+i and seller
r−i initiated transactions, and ǫˆi is the predicted value of ǫi.
In Chapter 4, I derived two competing equations for the expected return
of a hidden order. Under (E1), this was:
E [R|ǫ, v, θ, N ] =
ǫf(v)
1− φ
θ−φN1−φ, (6.9)
and under (E2), this was:
E [R|ǫ, v, θ, N ] = αǫf(v) log (1 +N). (6.10)
Eq. 6.9 suggests that the impact of a hidden order is a concave function of
its total volume (a power law with exponent greater than 1/2 but less than
1) and that the expected total impact can arbitrarily be scaled by changing
the speed of trading (changing θ). In the limit that θ is infinitely large, i.e.,
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the hidden order is traded infinitely slow, the expected total impact is zero.
Eq. 6.10 suggests that the impact of a hidden order is a concave function of
its total volume, specifically a logarithm, and that the impact is independent
of the speed of trading, 1/θ.
At the end of Chapter 4, I showed that transaction impacts should be com-
pletely transient under the assumptions of (E1) and they should be completely
permanent under the assumptions of (E2). The impact is transient under (E1)
because it decays by a fraction, ak, at each timestep into the infinite future and
the sum of these fractions approaches 1 at infinity. The impact is permanent
under (E2) because liquidity providers are assumed to know when a hidden
order completes - therefore, the hidden order no longer influences liquidity
when finished and its impact remains constant.
In Chapter 5, I used data to test the theory developed in the previous
chapters. I found that (E2) is supported by empirical data and that (E1)
is not. This result is surprising considering that information about hidden
orders is not explicitly available to the market participants setting liquidity. It
suggests that either market makers can discern this information or that market
participants condition their order flow on available liquidity such that they do
not produce predictable returns. When studying the response of buyer and
seller initiated transactions to their predictability, I qualitatively determined
that λ˜i is independent of Ω. Putting these results together, I formulated a
final version of the return (or price impact) model,
ri = ǫif(vi)−
∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
+ ηi. (6.11)
Using empirical data, I generated returns using the model and found that (1)
the returns were uncorrelated at lags larger than 20, (2) hidden order returns
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were distributed with a power law tail that matched the empirical data, and
(3) the magnitude of the returns were autocorrelated in a similar way to the
empirical data.
Finally, using data from hidden orders of size N ≥ 20, I showed that the
total impact of these orders builds continuously until they complete, decays
abruptly to 2/3 of its maximum value over the next 100 transactions, and
thereafter remains relatively constant.
88
Appendix A
A.1 Stock Market Preliminaries
Modern electronic markets follow the continuous double auction trading mech-
anism. This is structured such that buyers and sellers anonymously submit
orders into an order book. Once submitted, the order is either immediately
matched with another order (if both parties find the price agreeable), or is
stored in the order book until either cancelled or matched with an incoming
order. There are two basic order types that are placed into the order book.
The first is a limit order. Limit orders are requests to buy or sell a certain
volume (quantity) of stock at a specified limit price - the worst price at which
the participant is willing to transact. Limit orders to buy are often called bids
and limit orders to sell are often called offers ; and the intention to buy or sell
is often called the sign of the order. If a limit order is placed and there exists
no order of the opposite sign with a price agreeable to the limit price, then the
limit order is stored into the order book until either cancelled or transacted
with an incoming order. The other basic type of order is a market order. These
orders are requests to buy or sell a certain volume (quantity) of stock with
no limit price, meaning the order will accept the best available price currently
showing in the order book (called the best price). Market orders are immedi-
ately matched (transacted) with the order of opposite sign located at the best
price. If two orders specify the best price, then the market order transacts
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with the order that has been stored in the order book longer. It is possible
for an order to transact with more than one other order. For example, if a
market order requests 100 shares and the order at the best price is only for 50
shares, then the market order will transact 50 shares with the first order and
the remaining with each order sequentially showing the best price until all 100
shares have transacted.
In Fig. A.1 I show a schematic of the orderbook. Notice that there always
Figure A.1: A schematic of the order book used in modern electronic markets.
This figure is taken from the paper by Smith et al.[1]
exists two best prices. The best price willing to buy is called the best bid
price. The best price willing to sell is called the best offer price (sometimes
called the best ask price). The midpoint between these two prices is called the
midpoint price and is a standard reference for the current price of the stock.
The difference between the best bid and best offer price is called the spread.
Limit orders (and the prices they specify) are often referred to as quotes, espe-
cially if the limit order exists at the best price. Prices for electronic markets
are discrete, meaning that limit orders must specify prices in increments, the
minimum sized increment of price for a stock is called the tick size.
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A.2 Description of Data
Unless otherwise specified, all results presented in this thesis are from 6 stock
traded on the London Stock Exchange over the period May 20, 2000 to Dec 31,
2002. These stocks are Astrazeneca (AZN), British Sky Broadcasting Group
(BSY), Lloyds Tsb Group (LLOY), Prudential (PRU), Rentokil Initial (RTO),
and Vodafone Group (VOD). The London Stock Exchange contains two mar-
kets, an upstairs market and an electronic orderbook exchange called SETS.
The dataset I use contains all order flow information for the electronic ex-
change, but does not include any upstairs information. The electronic ex-
change contains roughly 60% of all traded volume during the period I study,
and is universally used to determine the current price of a stock.
Because I am only interested in transactions in this thesis, I do not consider
any of the various order types that exist in the dataset. I am only concerned
with whether an order causes a transaction or not. If it does, I use only in-
formation about the volume (measured in British Pounds £) and the sign
(whether initiated by a buyer or seller) of the transaction. Prices are deter-
mined using a reconstruction of the orderbook and referencing the midpoint
between the current best bid and best ask price. Returns are then measured as
the difference in the logarithm of this midpoint price measured from directly
before a transaction occurs to directly before the next transaction occurs. The
initial impact of a transaction, when used in this thesis, is measured as the dif-
ference in the logarithm of the midpoint price from directly before to directly
after the transaction.
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A.2.1 Properties of the Individual Stocks
The following table contains a list of measured parameters that are used in this
thesis. The Hurst exponent of the transaction sign series, ǫi, is measured using
Security Transactions H f1 f2 α φ
AZN 569321 0.68 9.4× 10−5 .12 1.64 .18
BSY 359479 0.68 1.9× 10−4 .12 1.64 .18
LLOY 599739 0.69 9.6× 10−5 .14 1.62 .19
PRU 392020 0.70 1.9× 10−4 .11 1.60 .20
RTO 213474 0.73 1.6× 10−4 .16 1.54 .23
VOD 1047833 0.67 2.7× 10−5 .25 1.66 .17
Table A.1: Table of parameters for the six stocks studied in this thesis.
the periodogram method. The parameters of the one transaction price impact
function, f(vi) = f1v
f2
i , are measured by first binning the data by volumes and
measuring the expected return for each bin; then the log of volumes and log
of expected returns is fit by a line using least squares. The parameters of this
fit determine f1 and f2. The parameters α and φ are both determined using
the Hurst exponent, α = 3− 2H and φ = H − 1/2.
A.3 Referenced Assumptions,
Interpretations, etc.
From Section 2.3.3,
(A1) The weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) holds. That is,
E[ri|Ω] = 0. (A.1)
(A2) λ˜i is independent of ǫi and f(vi).
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(A3) E [ǫif(vi)|Ω] can be approximated by an infinite autoregressive model
for ǫi and f(vi) with coefficients determined by treating ǫi as a FARIMA
process.
From Section 2.4,
(I1) The impact of the transaction at time i is
(
ǫif(vi)− λ˜i
)
with noise and
is permanent.
(I2) The impact of the transaction at time i is ǫif(vi) with noise and is
transient. λ˜i is the instantaneous decay at time i of past transactions.
From Section 3.2.1,
(R1) Market participants exhibit autocorrelated orderflow (most likely be-
cause they have split up into pieces a much larger order).
(R2) Market participants do not correlate with each others orderflow.
From Section 3.2.2,
(P1) There are a group of market participants that collectively con-
dition liquidity on past orderflow such that Eq. 3.7 holds. At
time i, these participants force transactions with the same sign as ǫi−k
to have lower impact and/or transactions with the opposite sign as ǫi−k
to have larger impact. They do so because there is a certain probability
that participant p will place another transaction at time i with known
sign ǫi−k. The participants are thought of as market makers who do not
want the price to become superdiffusive.
(P2) Market participant p conditions her transactions on the liquid-
ity parameter such that Eq. 3.7 holds. If participant p notices
that her trades are causing large impacts, she may decide to postpone
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the trade to some later time or reduce the size of her transactions vi -
in fact, she may not be willing to trade at all unless she does observe
liquidity as dictated in Eq. 3.7. Instead of market makers who work
to keep the price diffusive, the participants that determine liquidity are
patient position takers that are willing to wait for participant p to cause
transactions.
From Section 3.3,
(E1) Assume that (P1) is correct and that the best predictor of ǫif(vi) is an
autoregressive model.
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω] =∑
k>0
akǫi−kf(vi−k). (A.2)
(E2) Take that (R1) and (R2) are correct. Assume one of the following: (P2)
is true, or alternatively, (P1) is true and market makers have information
about who is initiating transactions and when they have finished placing
a hidden order.
E
[
λ˜i
∣∣∣Ω′] =∑
j
Ai,j
(
nj
nj + 1
)α
ǫjf(vj)
θj
, (A.3)
where Ω′ is information about all of the active hidden orders (those with
Ai,j = 1) . . . this includes their sign ǫj , their typical size vj , the average
number of timesteps between transactions for the order θj , and how many
pieces of the order have already been transacted nj. I use Ω
′ instead of
Ω because it is not necessarily publicly discernable information.
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Appendix B
Low-Dimensional Open Chaotic
Systems
In addition to my econophysics research, I have also researched low-dimensional
open chaotic systems. In the following, I present my work in this area.
B.1 Introduction
Flows are a frequent topic of research among physicists - fluid flow [47], traffic
flow [48], crowd movement [49], and granular flow [50] are just a few examples.
They are of particular interest because the particles that constitute the flow
can exhibit complex behavior at certain flow parameters. There is a large body
of work focused on understanding the cause of this motion and predicting the
patterns and structures that these flows produce [47, 48, 49, 50, 51].
Most flows consist of many mutually interacting degrees of freedom and a
complete description of the dynamics is often impossible. It is not surprising
then, that theories have historically focused on a statistical description of
complex flow [52]. Several studies, however, suggest that we can understand
flows at a more fundamental level. Cellular automata fluid models are an
example - for certain types of flows, the scale and particulars of collisions
seem unimportant to the overall structure of the flow[53, 54]. The study of
bifurcations in Taylor-Couette flow [55] suggest that the complicated motion
in large scale flows can result from the interplay of a few chaotic degrees of
freedom. Several authors have successfully extended these ideas to the general
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study of large coherent structures in fluid flow [56]. Finally, it has recently
been shown that a one-dimensional series of nonlinear oscillators, when driven,
can behave quite similar to larger scale turbulent flow [57]
We seek to study complex open-boundary flow using a bottom up ap-
proach - by studying the simplest possible flows that exhibit complex motion.
The low-dimensional model we present here is unique because particles inter-
act with linear forces and the system has open boundaries. There are many
studies of low-dimensional, closed -boundary dissipative systems in the liter-
ature. Examples include driven, damped pendulums, the Lorenz equations,
and driven Frenkel-Kontorova models [58, 59]. Like these driven, dissipative
systems, the system we present continually gains and depletes energy, but it
also allows particles to pass across boundaries into and out of the flow. Re-
search of complex, yet very low-dimensional, open-boundary systems is scarce
in the literature.
We present below a simple one-dimensional flow with open boundaries that
exhibits chaotic dynamics. The system consists of a line of point particles in-
teracting with nearest neighbors according to a linear force law (Hooke’s law).
These particles travel towards an inlet at constant velocity, pass into a region
where they are free to move according to their nearest neighbor interactions,
and then pass an outlet where they are driven so that they have a sinusoidally
varying velocity. This outlet driving force continually supplies energy to the
system and energy is dissipated when particles exit at any point away from
their equilibrium position. As the amplitude of the outlet oscillations is in-
creased, we find that the resident time of particles between the inlet and outlet
follows a bifurcating route to chaos. We discuss the resulting dynamics of this
system and suggest possible implications for larger dimensional flows.
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B.2 A Simple One-Dimensional Discrete
Flow
x
x xx i+1 i i-1
x    (t) = v
.
 v + A cos(ω(t-t   ))
.
out
x    (t) =
S
0 L
i
i
i
Figure B.1: Diagram of the system. A series of point particles are connected by
ideal springs and initially spaced S apart. Before reaching x = 0 (the inlet) and
after passing x = L (the outlet), each particle is constrained to the velocities
shown. A particle moves according to its nearest neighbor interactions when
between these points.
The system consists of a one-dimensional chain of identical point particles
spaced a distance S apart and connected by ideal springs. The particles travel
in the xˆ-direction and their positions are labeled xi, where i is the index
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The number of particles N is chosen large enough so that
the flow is sustained throughout our simulations. Particles undergo different
dynamics as they pass certain points along the flow. Fig. B.1 is a schematic
of the system.
The inlet is located at x = 0, the outlet at x = L, and the region between
is referred to as the chamber. The initial spacing between particles, S, is
chosen large enough so that only one particle is located in the chamber at
any moment in time. The time when particle i reaches x = 0 is labeled tiin
and is calculated tiin = iS/v. The time when particle i reaches x = L is
labeled tiout and is determined implicitly from the equation xi(t
i
out) = L. The
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velocity of a particle before and after these times is constrained as given in
Eqs. (B.1a,B.1b). Particle velocities are not constrained between tiin and t
i
out.
x˙i = v t < t
i
in, (B.1a)
x˙i = v + A cos
[
ω(t− tiout)
]
t ≥ tiout. (B.1b)
Here A and ω are the amplitude and frequency of velocity oscillations after
reaching the outlet.
If we consider nearest neighbor interactions for all particles, then the forc-
ing functions required for these constraints are nontrivial. This is simpli-
fied greatly by assuming that particles before the inlet and after the outlet
are not influenced by their neighbors; the result is that there is no forcing
for particles before the inlet, and an oscillatory forcing for particles, Fi =
−Aω sin [ω(t− tiout)], after the outlet. This asymmetry in interaction might
exist in real flows in two ways. First, if the flow consists of agents and not
particles, then the chamber simply represents a region where agents (who
normally follow simple velocity patterns) suddenly become concerned about
nearest neighbors. A physical example of this might be the boundary between
two regions of traffic flow, where drivers who are normally unconcerned about
the cars around them change behavior to coincide with neighboring vehicles at
this boundary. Second, for continuous flow, the regions of flow directly before
the inlet and directly after the outlet might contain much more mass than
the flow within the chamber. This means that flow within the chamber would
react to the motion of neighboring regions, but once outside, would move with
little regard for what is occurring in the chamber.
The system as a whole could be replicated experimentally by placing the
string of particles on two separate conveyors that are separated by a distance
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L and that lock the particles in place - the first conveyor operates at constant
velocity as in Eq. B.1a and the second oscillates such that particles are driven
according to Eq. B.1b.
The following are the complete equations of motion for the particles.
xi = vt− iS t < t
i
in, (B.2a)
mx¨i + 2kxi = k(xi−1 + xi+1) t
i
in ≤ t < t
i
out, (B.2b)
x˙i = v + A cos
[
ω(t− tiout)
]
t ≥ tiout. (B.2c)
All particles have the same mass, m, and the linear restoring force, k, is
the same for all springs. The solution for the position of the ith particle for
times tiin ≤ t ≤ t
i
out is given in Eq. (B.3). It is used to solve xi(t
i
out) = L
implicitly for tiout using Newton’s method.
xi(t) = B1 cos(
√
2/αt) +B2 sin(
√
2/αt) + (B.3)
A
ω(2− αω2)
sin
[
ω(t− ti−1out )
]
+ vt+
L− vti−1out − S
2
, (B.4)
where,
α = m/k (B.5a)
B1 = −
L− vti−1out − S
2
+
A
ω(2− αω2)
sin(ωti−1out ) (B.5b)
B2 = −
A√
2/α(2− αω2)
cos(ωti−1out ). (B.5c)
B.3 Chaotic Dynamics of the System
In all of the following results, we use the following parameters: S = 100, L = 2,
v = 10, α = .06, ω = 13.2, A = 0 to 40. These parameter values ensure that,
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at most, only one particle is located in the chamber at any moment in time.
For each particle we calculate the resident time within the chamber. This
quantity is defined,
tires = t
i
out − t
i
in. (B.6)
tiin is determined from Eq. B.1a and t
i
out is determined by numerically solving
Eq. B.3 for xi(t
i
out) = L. Fig. B.2 shows several return maps for the resident
time (these map tires to t
i+1
res ). In general t
i+1
res = f(t
i
res, t
i−1
res , ...), but for this
system,
ti+1res = f(t
i
res), (B.7)
i.e., the return map is one-dimensional. This results from constraining particle
velocities before x = 0 and after x = L - reducing the system to only one degree
of freedom.
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Figure B.2: Return map for tires for several values of the amplitude, (a) A = 0,
(b) A = 15, (c) A = 25, (d) A = 30, (e) A = 35, (f) A = 40. Parameters for
this simulation were: S = 100, L = 2, v = 10, α = .06, ω = 13.2.
As A is increased, a peak develops in the return map and the fixed point
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Figure B.3: (a) Bifurcation diagram of tires plotted for values of A from 25
to 40. (b) The Lyapunov exponent, λ, as a function of the amplitude of
outlet oscillations, A, also from 25 to 40. Parameters for this simulation were:
S = 100, L = 2, v = 10, α = .06, ω = 13.2. The first three bifurcation points
are located at A = 29.0, A = 32.1, and A = 33.1; and λ > 0 first at A = 33.4
eventually becomes unstable. The one-hump map that develops is likely to
exhibit the features of many other unimodal return maps - specifically a bi-
furcation route to chaos [60]. As Fig. B.3a shows, this is indeed the case. The
system is iterated onto the attractor and the next 100 values for tires are plot-
ted for values of the amplitude, A, from 25 to 40. The resident time bifurcates
several times and eventually becomes chaotic before settling back to a period
three dynamics. The first three bifurcation points are located at A = 29.0,
A = 32.1, and A = 33.1.
In Fig. B.3b we plot the Lyapunov exponent λ for the resident time as
a function of the amplitude A. The Lyapunov exponent is a measure of the
separation of infinitesimally close trajectories and in this case is calculated
numerically from the following equation,
λ = lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
log
∣∣f ′(tires)∣∣. (B.8)
When λ > 0 trajectories exponentially diverge, which produces chaos when
the trajectories remain bounded. The system becomes chaotic at A = 33.4
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where λ first turns positive.
B.4 Conclusions
The system we present above is quite different than other one-dimensional
particle models in the literature [57, 59]. Instead of using nonlinear interac-
tions between particles, the particles in our system interact with linear forces
and constraints are applied abruptly at the boundaries. This shows that com-
plex motion can arise in a flow at the boundary between simple constrained
motions without the need for nonlinear interactions between particles. Many
large scale flows contain regions where the dynamics are tightly constrained
to regular motion, with complex motion occuring at the boundaries between
these regions. Simple models such as the one we have presented can provide
insight into how this behavior develops.
Summarizing, we have presented a fully describable one-dimensional flow
of point particles connected by ideal springs. Particle motion is constrained
before reaching an inlet and after passing an outlet, and the system is shown to
exhibit chaotic dynamics when particles are driven sinusoidally after crossing
the outlet. The outlet driving force continually adds energy to the system.
No drag force is present, but energy is dissipated when particles exit at any
point away from their equilibrium positions. The model can be reduced to a
one-dimensional map that produces chaotic dynamics, showing that chaos can
occur in flows at the boundary between simple constrained motion, even when
particles in the flow interact with linear forces.
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